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Frankenstein.  It  argues  that  
Frankenstein      colonial  
discourse,  the  nature  of  the  colonial  other  and  the  place  of  this  other  within  Western  society.  
By   charting   how   this   discourse   functions   in   the   construction   of   physical   alterity,   this   paper  
argues  that  through  his  exposure  to  language  and  society   complicit  in  
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  the  base  Laws  of  Servitude  began,  
When  wild  in  the  woods  the  noble  Savage  ran.  
(Dryden,  The  Conquest  of  Granada,  I.  I.  i.  201-­‐9)  
  
In   his   book   Emile:   Or   Education,   published   in   1762,   Jean   Jacques   Rousseau  wrote  
makes   all   things   good;  man  meddles  with   them  and   they  become  evil. 1      principle  
concern   was   that   people,   through   social   convention,   destroy   and   corrupt   themselves.   He  
argued   that,   ]2  destroys   and   defaces   all   things;   he   loves   all   that   is   deformed   and  
monstrous;  he  will  have  nothing  as  nature  made  it,  not  even  man  himself,  who  must  learn  his  
paces  like  a  saddle-­‐horse 3  Rousseau  
contends  that  it  is  only  through  a  reformed  system  of  education  that  humankind  can  avoid  this  
socially  imposed  auto-­‐corruption.  In  a  review  of  Mary   s  novel  Frankenstein  in  1818,  her  
husband,  Percy  Bysshe  Shelley  wrote,  
  
In  this  the  direct  moral  of  the  book  consists;  and  it  perhaps  the  most  important,  and  of  the  most  
universal  application,  of  any  moral  that  can  be  enforced  by  example.  Treat  a  person  ill,  and  he  will  
become  wicked.  Requite  affection  with  scorn;  -­‐  let  one  being  be  selected,  for  whatever  cause,  as  
the   refuse  of  his  kind      divide  him,   a   social   being,   from  society,  and  you   impose  upon  him   the  
irresistible  obligations     malevolence  and  selfishness.4  
  
ding   of   the   text  may  be   unusual   for   its   time,   his   views  
significantly  mirror  those  espoused  by  Rousseau  in  Emile.  It  is  a  preoccupation  with  this  socially  
dictated   corruption   of   the   individual   which   drives   this   reading   of   Frankenstein,5  similarly  
                                                                                                                    
1  Jean-­‐Jacques  Rousseau,  Emile:  Or  Education,  trans.  Barbara  Foxley  (London:  J.  M.  Dent  and  Sons,  1933),  5.  
2  The  generic  masculine  is  used  here  in  order  to  provide  consistency  with  its  use  by  Rousseau.  
3  Ibid,  5.  
4  Percy  Bysshe   Frankenstein:  or,  the  Modern  Prometheus The  Prose  Works  of  Percy  Bysshe  Shelley,  
ed.,  E.  B.  Murray  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1993),  283.  
5  Although  generally  in  relation  to  his  Second  Discourse,  see  Jean-­‐Jacques  Rousseau,   se  on  the  Origin  of  
  The  Social  Contract  and  the  Discourses,  trans.  George  D.  H.  Cole  (London:  J.  M.  Dent  and  Sons,  
1913),  there  has  been  a  large  body  of  work  produced  which  argues  that  the  works  of  Rousseau  play  a  central  role  
Frankenstein.  See,  most  significantly,  Paul  Cantor,  Creature  and  Creator:  Myth-­‐Making  and  
English  Romanticism  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1984),  120-­‐
Mary  Shelley:  Her  Life  Her  Fiction  Her  Monsters  (London:  Routledge,  1988),  38-­‐













informing  this  reading  
within  the  novel.6  
  
This   process   of  
novel  on  the  slopes  of  Montanvert   ow  can  I  move  thee?  
Will  no  intreaties  (sic)  cause  thee  to  turn  a  favourable  eye  upon  thy  creature,  who  implores  thy  
goodness  and  compassion 7  For,  he  claims,   I  was  benevolent;  my  soul  glowed  with  love  and  
humanity;  but  am   I  not  alone,  miserably  alone?  You,  my  creator,  abhor  me;  what  hope  can   I  
gather   from   your   fellow   creatures,   who   owe   me   nothing? 8   ,   while  
beginning  in  a  state  of   benevolence ,  departs  from  this  as  the  narrative  progresses  
and  he  is  driven  from  a  society  who  spurns  and  hates  him.9  He  is  not  born  a  monster,  rather  as  
he   relates   10  It   is   his  
isolation  which  breeds  this  discontent.  For,  as  he  says   to  Frankenstein,  
thy  creature;  I  ought  to  be  thy  Adam,  but  I  am  rather  the  fallen  angel,  whom  thou  drivest  from  
11  If   it   is  
   the  
12  is  contingent,  as  I  shall  argue  in  this  dissertation,  on  
his  experience  and  knowledge  of  the  world  and  society,  an  experience  informed  by  his  physical  
alterity.13  It   is      exposure   to   language  and  education,  however,  which  
                                                                                                                    
6  See  Lawrence   Frankenstein,  the  true  story;  or  Rousseau  judges  Jean-­‐ Frankenstein,  ed.  J.  
Paul  Hunter  (London:  W.  W.  Norton,  1996),  313-­‐31;   Richardson,   Emile  to  
Frankenstein:     European  Romantic  Review,  1:2  (1991):  147-­‐162.  Although  Richardson  
Emile  and  Shelley
education  as  presented  in  contemporary  domestic  fiction  as  well  as  the  female  Gothic  novel  (ibid,  149),  a  critique  
  
7  Mary  W.  Shelley,  Frankenstein  (London:  Penguin,  1994),  X,  96.  (Henceforth  referred  to  as  F.)  
8  ibid,  96.  
9  Ibid,  96.  
10  Ibid,  96.  
11  Ibid,  96.  
12  Which  is  to  say,  his  change  from  an  essentially  benevolent  being  to  one  capable  of  murder.  
13  It  must  be  noted  that  this  term  is  used  subjectively,  that  is  to  say,  his  alterity  is  understood  in  relation  to  













brings  him  into  contact  with  the  systems  of  thought  which  inform  this  exclusion,  systems  which  
describe,   define   and   categorise   him   as   existing   outside   of   this   self-­‐same   society.   He   is  
understood  within   these  systems,  as  he   is  made  to  understand  himself,  as  non-­‐European  and  
because  of  this  an  extra-­‐social  being.  His  linguistic  and  social  education  is,  in  this  way,  the  site  
of   t    him   in   the   system   and   discourse   which   names   him   a  
monster.    
  
By  naming  his  creation  from  the  beginning  of  his  life
miserably   gi ,14  
Frankenstein   is   conceptually   creating   his   creature   as   just   this:   a   monster.  
creature  is  construed  in  the  text  as  being  somatically  different,  a  difference  which  underwrites  
his  monstrosity.  He   is  monstrous   in   the  text  as  a   result  of  his   inability   to  adhere  to  European  
physical  norms.  His  somatic  distancing  from  this  norm  extends  to  the  extent  that  he  is  placed  
inevitably  somewhere  between  the  living  and  the  dead  by  Frankenstein.15  He  is  as  Frankenstein  
claims,   d  his  physical  nature  suggest  this.  As  Walton  describes  him,  he  is  not  only  
16  
17  His  lips  and  skin  hint  if  not  at  death,  at,  as  
Ann  Mellor  suggests,   .18  The  creature  is,  however,  more  than  this.  He  
is   constructed   within   the   text,   not   merely   as   a   corruption   of   the   West,   diseased,   dead   or  
otherwise,   but   also   in   a  manner   suggestive   of   racial   colonial   discourse.  He   is,   as   Joseph   Lew  
argues,   an   actively   racialised   construction,     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
difference  does  not  have  any  other  points  of  reference  for  as  the  creature  himself  says,  
F.,  XIII,  116),  but  rather  in  the  context  of  the  novel  as  well  
experience  and  eventual  understanding  of  the  world,  he  can  be  best  understand,  as  he  does  himself,  in  relation  to  
Europe.  
14  F.,  V,  56.  
15  He  is  described,  once  Frankenstein  has  brought  him  to  life  in  book  V,  in  keeping  with  this  by  Frankenstein  who  
is  yellow  skin  scarcely  covered  the  work  of  muscles  and  arteries  beneath;  his  hair  was  lustrous  black,  
and  flowing;  his  teeth  of  pearly  whiteness;  but  these  luxurancies  only  formed  a  more  horrid  contrast  with  his  
watery  eyes,  that  seemed  almost  of  the  same  colour  as  the  dun-­‐white  sockets  in  which  they  were  set,  his  
shrivelled  complexion  and  straight  black  lips F.,  V,  55).  
16  ibid,  letter  iv,  23.  
17  ibid,  V,  55.  
18  Anne  K.  Mellor,   :  an  introduction  to  Frankenstein   The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Mary  













readers   through   the   wealth   of   racial   stereotypes   available   to   them   within   Western   colonial  
discourse  at  the  time.  This  is  not  a  surprising  assertion,  for  while  the  British  Empire  was  not  yet  
at   the   height   of   its   influence,   this   period   witnesses   the   beginnings   of   what   has   been   often  
19  British  Empire.20  Frankenstein   is  a  novel  situated  at  the  heart  of  a  time  
period,   categorised   not   only   by   the   French   Revolution,   but   so   too   by   the   formation   of   this  
   Empire;   a  period  which   sees   Britain   losing   the  American   colonies   but   subsequently  
expanding  rapidly  into  the  rest  of  the  world.    
  
According  to  Saree  Makdisi,  between  the  years  1790  and  1830  
21  With  the  solidification  of  British  rule   in  
India   through   William      in   1784,   on-­‐going   debates   regarding   the   abolition   of  
slavery,22  and   increasing   contact   with   China23  and   the   African   interior,24  
                                                                                                                    
19  See  Vincent  T.  Harlow,  The  Founding  of  the  Second  British  Empire,  1763-­‐1793  
David  Armitage,  The  Ideological  Origins  of  the  British  Empire  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2000).  It  
purposes  and  personnel,  and  the  differences  between  the  maritime,  commercial  colonies  of  settlement  in  North  
Armitage,  Origins  of  British  
Empire,  2).  
20  This  is  a  period,  which  following  the  Peace  of  Paris  in  1783  and  the  acknowledgement  of  the  independence  of  
the  American  colonies,  signals  a  move  in  British  influence  eastward  towards  India  and  Pacific  Ocean.  See  Armitage,  
Origins  of  British  Empire,  2;  and  Harlow,  Founding  of  the  Second  Empire,  64.  It  has  alternatively  been  argued  that  
surprising  considering  the  foundations  of  British  colonial  power  in  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century  lay,  
for  the  most  part,  in  India.  See  Ernest  A.  Benians,  Arthur  P.  Newton,  and  John  H.  Rose,  eds.,  The  Cambridge  History  
of  the  British  Empire  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1929),  61;  and  Wm.  Roger  Louis,  ed.,  The  Oxford  
History  of  the  British  Empire  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1998),  99.      
21  Saree  Makdisi,  Romantic  Imperialism:  Universal  Empire  and  the  Culture  of  Modernity  (Cambridge:  University  of  
Cambridge  Press,  1998),  xi.  
22  For  Frankenstein  and  contemporary  writings  on  slavery  and  race,  see  Harold  L.  
Monster  and  Images  of  Race  in  Nineteenth-­‐Cen   
,  Harold  Bloom,  ed.  (New  York:  Chelsea  House  Publishers,  2007),  61-­‐94;  
Anne  K.   Frankenstein,  Racial  Sc   Nineteenth  Century  Contexts,  23  (2001):  1-­‐28;  
Debbie  Lee,  Slavery  and  the  Romantic  Imagination  (Philadelphia:  University  of  Pennsylvanian  Press,  2002);  and  
Joseph  W.  Lew,     Studies  in  
Romanticism.  30:2  (1991):  255-­‐82.  Malchow  argues  that  Shelley  drew  on  contemporary  attitudes  to  non-­‐whites  in  
regarding  the  debate  around  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  West  Indies.  Lew  however  asserts  that  the  creature  is  
Bengali,  while  Mellor  takes  this  a  step  further  contending  that  any  specific  source  for  the  creature  is  less  important  
than  the  fact  of  his  basic  alterity.      
23  While  the   anton  













situated  in  a  time  period  when  the  British  were  becoming  rapidly  and  increasingly  aware  of  the  
rest  of  world.  In  many  ways  the  cre physical  make-­‐up  comes  to  embody  just  this  as  he  is  
ambiguously  situated  within  a  set  of  racial  stereotypes  which  distances  him  from  the  European  
ideal;  his  somatic  identity  functions   . 25  The  creature  is  seen,  
as  described  by  Walton,  as     some  undiscovered  island. 26  He  is  perceived  
by  others  within  the  text  as  monstrous  and  savage,  a  position  which   is   justified  through  their  
understanding  of  him  as  racially  other.27   creature  may,  for  all  intents  and  
purposes,   be   a  unique  being,   he   is   nevertheless  able   to   stand   in   for   the   unfamiliar   racialised  
non-­‐European  other.  Along  these  lines,  Mellor  is  prompted  to  write  that,    
  
consequences  of  our  ways  of  reading  or  seeing  the  world,  of  our  habit  of  imposing  meanings  on  
that   which   we   cannot   truly   know.   In   Frankenstein,   human   beings   typically   construe   the  
unfamiliar,   the   abnormal,   the   unique   as   dangerous  or   evil,   a   construction   given   form   in   their  
language.28  
  
I  would  venture  to  take  this  a  step  further,  arguing  that  through  his  exposure  to  language  and  
complicit   in   this   process   of   imposition   in   which,  
through  his  physical   alterity  he   is  placed  as   the  object  of  a  discourse  which  construes  him  as  
abnormal,  dangerous  and  evil.  He  is,  however,  not  merely  a  passive  object  of  this  discourse  but,  




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
24     Mungo  Park,  Travels  in  
the  interior  districts  of  Africa:  Performed  under  the  Direction  and  Patronage  of  the  African  Association  in  the  Years  
1795,  1796  and  1797,  ed.  Kate  Ferguson  (London:  Duke  University  Press,  2000).  
25   Frankenstein ,  22.  
26  F.,  letter  iv,  24.  
27  Which  is  to  say,  he  is  cast  as  not  only  different  but  also  inferior  to  those  that  perceive  him.  See  Myra  Jehlen,  
Readings  at  the  Edge  of  Literature  (Chicago:  Chicago  University  
Press,  2001).  He  is  conceived  in  the  same  terms  as  the  colonial  other  who  Myra  Jehlen  writes  is  rendered  through  
somewhat  from  this  understanding  of  the  term  through  his  active  participation  in  the  process  of  othering.  














Constructing	  the	  Other	  
  
It   is  my   contention   that   Frankenstein   and   the   ed    are   both  
deeply  rooted  in  colonial  discourse,  the  nature  of  the  colonial  other  and  the  place  of  this  other  
within  Western  society.  Writing  on  Frankenstein,  Jane  Eyre  and  The  Wide  Sargasso  Sea  in  1985  
Gayatri   Spivak   called   for   a   move   towards   a   recognition   of   global   interconnectivity   and  
Imperialism  as  crucial  aspects  of  nineteenth  century  British  Literature.  She  wrote  that,    
  
It  should  not  be  possible  to  read  nineteenth-­‐century  British  literature  without  remembering  that  
imperialism,   understood   as   England's   social   mission,   was   a   crucial   part   of   the   cultural  
representation   of   England   to   the   English.   The   role   of   literature   in   the   production   of   cultural  
representation   should  not  be   ignored.   These   two  obvious   "facts"   continue   to  be  disregarded   in  
the  reading  of  nineteenth-­‐century  British  literature.29  
  
  argument  begs  
of  how   imperial  discourse   functions   in   the  
30  Joseph  Lew  has  seized  upon  this  approach,  arguing  that  Oriental  narratives  and  
Orientalism  form  an   integral  part  of  Frankenstein.31  His  approach   is  not  unusual  when  dealing  
with  eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  century  texts.  Indeed,  much  has  been  made  of  the  use  of  
the  Orient  as  a  category  which  serves  as  a  validation  of  Occidental  identity  and  culture.  While  
this  dialogic  approach  may  seem  somewhat  outdated,  even  naïve  in  its  simplicity,  it  continues  
to  carry,  I  believe,  valence  in  the  reading  of  nineteenth  century  British  literature.  Ros  Ballaster  
certainly  makes  much  of  this   in  his   influential  work,  Fabulous  Orients32  in  which  he  charts  the  
                                                                                                                    
29  Gayatri  C.  Spivak,  "Three  Women's  Texts  and  a  Critique  of  Imperialism",  Critical  Inquiry  12  (1985):  243  
30  Ibid,  243-­‐4.  See  also  Ania  Loomba,  "Overworlding  the  'Third  World'"  Oxford  Literary  Review  13:1-­‐2  (1991);  and  
Gayatri  Spivak,     History  and  Theory  24:3  (1985).  Ania  
worldling  of  the  'Third  World'  by  [the]  imperialist  and  colonial  plunder  and  its  intellectual  
co-­‐ Loomba,  "Overworlding  the  
'Third  World'",  184)   ,     247).  For  as  Spivak  
explains,  it  is  
curricularized  in  English  translation  [which]  helps  the  emergence  of  "Third  World"  as  a  convenient  signifier  that  
ibid).    
31       














erature   in   the  period   immediately  preceding  but  
also   during   the   Romantic   literary   movement.   His   argument   is   predicated   on   the   idea   that  
Orient  and  Occident  and  ma 33  This  is  important  through  
how   this   understanding   of   the   Orient   as   inherently   inferior   to   the   Occident   functions   as   a  
demonstration  of  how  the  power  structures  within  the  discursive  process  of  othering  function.  
In   keeping   with   this,   for   Makdisi,   the   Orient   became   at   this   time  
degraded   version   of   the   Occident. 34  In   much   the   same   vein,   Orientalism35  
serves,   though   he   was  more   concerned   with   the   latter   part   of   the   nineteenth   century,   as   a  
useful   text   in   this   regard.  His  development  of  a  discursive  understanding  of   colonial  othering  
  imperialism  functions  in  the  cultural  representation  and  understanding  
.36  He     is  a  style  
of   thought   based   upon   an   ontological   and   epistemolo the  
37  a  distinction  informed  by  the  type  of  inequality  
highlighted  by  Makdisi.  Said   is  drawing  here  on  the  Foucauldian  notion  of  discourse   in  which  
power  circulates  within  the  structures  of  language  that  c .  Said  
   1908      as   a  means   of   explaining   Once  
again,   knowledge   of   subject   races   or   Orientals   is   what   makes   their   management   easy   and  
profitable;   knowledge   gives   power,   more   power   requires   more   knowledge,   and   so   on   in   an  
38  Power  gained  through  knowledge  
is   the   founding  principle   for  Said   in   the  profitable  subjugation  of  the  colonial   subject.  A  point  
                                                                                                                    
33  Ibid,  8.  
34  Makdisi.  Romantic  Imperialism,  113.    
35  Edward  W.  Said,  Orientalism  (London:  Penguin,  1978).  
36  See  Said,  Orientalism;  and  Culture  and  Imperialism  (London:  Vintage,  1994);  and  in  relation  to  Frankenstein  see  
Elizabeth  A.  
Empire  in  Frankenstein Eighteenth-­‐Century  Life,  18:3(1994):  23-­‐36;  
understanding  of  Frankenstein  
Percy  Bysshe  Shelly  and  Lord  Byron  at  the  time  and  the  Oriental  interests  of  Walton  and  Henry  Clerval  within  the  
text.  
37  Said,  Orientalism,  2.  













which  he  makes   in  reference  to  Arthur  James  Balfour
.39  The   logic  
which  underpins  B   as  Said  succinctly  charts  it    
  
England   knows   Egypt;   Egypt   is   what   England   knows;   England   knows   that   Egypt   cannot   have   self-­‐
government;   England   confirms   this   by   occupying   Egypt;   for   the   Egyptians,   Egypt   is   what   England   has  
orary  
Egyptian  civilization;  Egypt  requires,  indeed  insists  upon,  British  occupation.40  
  
significant   in   its  demonstration  of  the  exercising  of  colonial  discourse  through  the  assumption  
of   superiority  on   the  basis  of   knowledge.  On   the  one  hand,  what  Balfour   is   demonstrating   is  
how   knowledge   of   the   Orient   produces   a   discourse   which   functions   as   what   Said   terms  
   ern   style   for   dominating,  
restructuring,  and  having  authority  over  the  Orient. 41  What  his  argument  also  highlights  is  how  
colonial  discourse  is  monologic   in  nature  through  its   lack  of  consideration  for  the  voice  of  the  
Oriental.   In   the  mind  of  Balfour,  Occidental  power  over   the  Orient  becomes  both   logical  and  
42  a  sentiment  which  
                                                                                                                    
39   Frankenstein  for  while  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt  
similar  debates  
concerning  foreign  governance  in  the  region.  Most  notable  were  the  some  167  scholars  and  scientists  who  
creation  which  Said  sees  as  
ibid,  42).  Said  sites  
and  the  founding  of  the     as  being  instrumental  in  the  
modern  experience  of  the  Orient  as  interpreted  from  within  the  universe  of  discourse  founded  by  Napoleon  in  
Egypt,  whose  agencies  of  domination  and  dissemination  included  the  Institut  and  the  Description ibid,  87).  
through  Napol
nineteenth  century.            
40  Ibid,  34.  
41  Ibid,  3.  













is   based   on   the   active   propagation   of   a   knowledge   that   Egypt   is   past .43  F
perspective  this  is  an  ontological  fact  based  on  a  knowledge  of  their  past  and  one  which  has  in  
turn   been   expanded   on   in   the   vein   of   hi
Nevertheless,  while  his  logic  may  be  flawed,  the  construction  of  a  system  of  knowledge  in  this  
way   becomes   an   ontological   act,   a   construction   of   the   Orient,   but   very   importantly,   a  
construction  within  English  parameters  and  one  which  in  turn  is  designed  to  serve  the  English  
imperial   imperative.   For   this   reason,   it   is   a   construction   which   is   predicated   on   the  
establishment   and   perpetuation   of   difference,   a   difference   which   becomes   through   the  
subjective  nature  of  its  construction  necessarily  inferior.  This  imperative  thereafter  serves  as  a  
tool   for   the   construction   as   well   as   a   validation   of   Occidental   identity   through   the   inferior  
nature  of  the  perceived  other.  
  
Colonialism  is  therefore   a  system  which  was  preoccupied  with  the  production  of  
knowl    to  
  which,   if   it  develops,   changes,  or  otherwise   transforms   itself   in  
the   way   that   civilizations   frequently   do,   nevertheless   is   fundamentally,   even   ontologically  
.44  What   the   production   of   knowledge   of   a   people   does   then,   is   to   wrest   ontological  
agency  away  from  the  subject  of  this  knowledge.  This  knowledge  becomes  therefore  something  
,45  
but  something  which  nevertheless  retains,  or  even  constructs,  a  certain  truth  value  within  the  
defining  discourse.  In  light  of  this,  Peter  Hulme  argues  that,  in  keeping  with  this  predominantly  
Foucauldian  
.46  Truth  is  therefore  contingent  on  the  idea  of  discourse.  Truth  is  not  
                                                                                                                    
43   n  world  only  
because  the  powerful  and  up-­‐to-­‐date  empires  have  effectively  brought  them  out  of  the  wretchedness  of  their  
decline  and  turned  them  into  rehabilitated  residents  of  productive  colonies ibid,  35).  
44  Ibid,  32.  
45Michel  Foucault,  Power/Knowledge:  Selected  Interviews  &  Other  Writings  1972-­‐1977,  ed.  Colin  Gordon  (New  
York:  Pantheon  Books,  1980),  118.  
46  Peter  Hulme,  Colonial  Encounters:  Europe  and  the  Native  Caribbean,  1492-­‐1797  (London  and  New  York:  













something  which   is   objectively   attainable  but   something  which   is   subjectively   constructed  by  
those  in  power  of  the  discourse  in  which  that  truth  is  situated.  Hulme  thus  writes  that,                      
  
Underlying   the   idea   of   colonial   discourse,   in   other   words,   is   the   presumption   that   during   the   colonial  
period   large   parts   of   the   non-­‐European   world   were   produced   for   Europe   through   a   discourse   that  
imbricated  sets  of  questions  and  assumptions,  methods  of  procedure  and  analysis,  and  kinds  of  writing  
and   imagery,   normally   separated   out   into   the   discrete   areas   of  military   strategy,   political   order,   social  
reform,  imaginative  literature,  personal  memoir  and  so  on.47    
  
Truth  about  the  non-­‐European  world  is  therefore,  in  this  light,  ontologically  constructed  by  and  
for  Europe.  It  is  thus  known  and  made  within  a  discourse  which  is  able  to  label  its  constructions  
as   true.   Colonial   discourse   is   therefore   contingent   on   a   set   of   truth   values   dictated   in  many  
ways  by  it,  meaning  that  colonial  discourse  is  defined  in  opposition  to  a  set  of  values  which  it  
dictates.  In  keeping  with  this,  once  something  is  known  within  a  discourse  it  is  constructed  and  
defined,  even  made   from   the  perspective  of   the  owners  of   the  discourse.   It  becomes,  within  
that  discourse  a  stable  ontological  construction,  a  construction  which  denies  any  authority  or  
agency  on  the  part  of  the  su o  have  knowledge  of  such  a  thing  is  to  dominate  it,  to  
  the  Oriental  
country     since  we  know  it  and  it  exists,  in  a  sense,  as   48.  In  the  case  of  Balfour  and  
interrelationship   between   power   and   knowledge,   a   relationship  which   Said   expands   upon   in  
this  way:  
  
Knowledge  of  the  Orient,  because  generated  out  of  strength,  in  a  sense  creates  the  Orient,  the  Oriental,  
a  court  of   law),  something  one  studies  and  depicts  (as   in  curriculum),  something  one  disciplines  (as   in  a  
school  or  prison),   something  one   illustrates   (as   in  zoological  manual).  The  point   is   that   in  each  of   these  
cases  the  Oriental  is  contained  and  represented  by  dominating  frameworks.49  
  
Discourse,  in  the  shape  of  Orientalism,  has  then  the  power  to  confine  through  knowledge,  but  
only  if  that  knowledge  is  grounded  in  a  power  drawn  from  cultural  strength.  Thus  Foucauldian  
discourse  is,  when  deployed  by  Said  as  Orientalism,  grounded  in  Gramscian  hegemony.  In  other  
                                                                                                                    
47  Ibid,  2.  
48  Said,  Orientalism,  32.  













words   Orientalism   endures,   and   only   has   the   strength   it   does   as   a   result   of   the   cultural  
hegemony   of   the  West.   The   power   garnered   through   this   interplay   between   hegemony   and  
,   are   described   and  
,  the  Occi
culture   gained   in   strength   and   identity   by   setting   itself   off   against   the   Orient   as   a   sort   of  
.50  This   in   turn   speaks   to   his   assertion   that   one   of   the  
tal-­‐European   relations   was   that   Europe   was   always   in   a   position   of  
.51  By  defining,  understanding  and  knowing  the  Orient  in  such  a  
way   as   to   place   it   as   being   inferior   to   the  West,   the  West   was   able   to   use   the   Orient   as   a  
justification  for  the  superiority  of  Western  culture.  In  turn,  it  is  with  this  understanding,  as  Said  
highlights   in   his   citing   of   Balfour   and   Cromer,   that   the  West   is   able   to   justify   a  more   active  
deployment  and  propagation  of  Occidental  hegemony,  both  culturally  and  otherwise,  over  the  
creating   a  battlefront   that   separates   them   [the  Orient   and  Occident],   and   second,   as   inviting  
the   West   to   control,   contain,   and   otherwise   govern   (through   superior   knowledge   and  
.52  
  
Frankenstein  as  a  text  is  caught  up,  as  I  hope  to  demonstrate,  in  the  operations  of  the  type  of  
colonial  discourse  proposed  by  Said.  Elizabeth  Bohls  argues,  in  keeping  with  this,  that  aesthetics  
and  colonialism  are  inseparable  in  the  text.  She  write Her     critical  deployment  
of   aesthetics   reveals   it   to   be   an   imperial   discourse   -­‐   one   of   the   languages   of   high   culture,  
seemingly  far  removed  from  the  practical  tasks  of  empire,  but  actually  helping  produce  imperial  
subjects   to   carry   out   those   tasks. 53  In   much   this   way,   from   the   very   outset   of   the   novel  
ure   is   placed  within   the  physiological   system  which  defines  him   as  being  
non-­‐European,   as   being,   from   a   European   perspective,   other.   He   is   described,   on   his   first  
appearance   in   the   text,   as  
                                                                                                                    
50  Ibid,  3.  
51  Ibid,  40.  
52  Ibid,  47-­‐8.  













statur .54  He  is  not  described  by  Walton  as  a  man  bu ,  he  is  
described,  not  through     but  rather  through  recourse  to  
  There  exists  even  a   lack  of  authenticity   in  the  
scale  of  his  suggested  shape.  
the   outset   by  Walton   in   racial   terms.  Walton,   following   his   sighting   of   the   creature   seeks   to  
understand  him;  describing  him  as  seeming  to  
55  His   savage  nature  within   this   context   is,  however,   contingent  on   the   fact   that  he   is  
perceived  by  Walton  as  non-­‐European.  He  is  defined  in  opposition  to  Frankenstein  himself,  who  
is   described   from   the   outset   through   a   negative   comparison   with   his   own   creation.  
Frankenstein   is   not56,   as   the   other   s   creature]   ,57  he   is  
.58  By  being  placed  in  opposition  to  him,  the  creature  serves  to  validate  and  
  
.  In  much  the  same  way  as  Walton  understands  Frankenstein  in  
opposition   to  his   creature;  Myra   Jehlen  writes   that  
mere   negative   quantities   defined   by   an   opposition   to   which   they   do   not   contribute. 59  The  
establishment   of   a   binary   in   these   inherently   unequal   terms   thus   serves   to   justify   the  
superi in  this  case  the  Frankenstein  figure.    
  
Othering   becomes   here,   within   the   colonial   regime,   the   basis   of   the   power   structure   within  
which  it  functions.  For  Margaret  Greer,  Walter  Mignolo  and  Maureen  Quilligan,  although  they  
are  speaking  here  in  religious  terms,  racialised  discrimination  owes  its  beginnings  in  some  part  
Christians  were  one  of   the  groups  classified  and,   simultaneously,  possessors  of   the  privileged  
                                                                                                                    
54  F.,  letter  iv,  23.  
55  ibid,  24.  
56  My  emphasis  
57  Ibid.  
58  Ibid.  













60  Racial   colonial   discourse   owes   its   authority   then,  
not  only   to   the   classification  of  peoples   and   the  power   this   grants   the  classifiers  within   their  
established  discourse,  but  also  to  the  preservation  of  the  distance  between  the  classifiers  and  
the  classified.  Harry  Garuba  writes   that   the  key   to   the  power  of   colonial  discourse   lies   in   the  
mind/matter;   nature/nurture;   civilized/savage)   and   then   by   a   configuration   or   mapping   of  
61  In   this   understanding   of   the   ontological   process  
through   which   the   text   is   able   to   construct   the   respective   identities   of   the   two   characters  
(Frankenstein  and  his   creature),  one  cannot  know  what   it   is   to  be   civilised  unless  one  knows  
what  it  is  to  be  savage.  Thus  Frankenstein  cannot  be  understood  as  European  until  one  is  able  
to   place   him   in   opposition   to   that   which   is   savage,   in   this   case   his   creation.62  What   this  
highlights  above  all  is  the  need  for  the  existence  of  the  perceived  other  as  a  means  of  defining  
and  coming  to  terms  with  European  identity.  This  theme  is  played  out  with  tragic  consequences  
ing   the  
impossibility  of  his  own  existence  within  the  European  idiom  and  society,  which  constructs  him  
through  his  exclusion  from  it.  
  
   evident   from  Fra   
physical  appearance.  Frankenstein  relates,  
  
I   saw   the   dull   yellow   eye   of   the   creature   open;   it   breathed   hard,   and   a   convulsive   motion  
agitated   its   limbs.  How  can   I   describe  my  emotions  at   this   catastrophe,  or  how  delineate   the  
wretch  whom  with  such   infinite  pains  and  care   I  had  endeavoured  to   form?  His   limbs  were   in  
                                                                                                                    
60  Margaret  R.  Greer,  Walter  D.  Mignolo  and  Maureen  Quilligan,   Rereading  the  Black  Legend:  The  
Discourses  of  Religious  and  Racial  Difference  in  the  Renaissance  Empires,  eds.,  Margaret  R.  Greer,  Walter  D.  
Mignolo  and  Maureen  Quilligan  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  2007),  2.  
61  Harry  Garuba   
Alternation,  9:1  (2002):  88.  
62  See  Stuart  Hall,   in  Formations  of  Modernity,  eds.  Stuart  Hall  and  
Bram  Gieben  (London:  Polity  Press,  1996);  and  David  Scott,   Social  Text  43  (1995):  
191-­‐220.     t  
Hall,     277).  For,  what  begins  to  
become  apparent  as  the  text  














proportion,  and   I  had  selected  his   features  as  beautiful.  Beautiful?  Great  God!  His  yellow  skin  
scarcely  covered  the  work  of  muscles  and  arteries  beneath,  his  hair  was  of  a  lustrous  black,  and  
flowing;   his   teeth   of   a   pearly   whiteness;   but   these   luxuriances   only   formed   a   more   horrid  
contrast  with  his  watery  eyes,  that  seemed  almost  of  the  same  colour  as  the  dun  white  sockets  
in  which  they  were  set,  his  shrivelled  complexion,  and  straight  black  lips.63  
  
In  this  moment  Frankenstein  
word   truly   knows   and      a  monster.   He   is  
something  both  of  and  not  of  this  world.  His  yellow  skin,  pale  watery  eyes  and  black  lips  suggest  
at  first  apprehension  exactly  what  he  is  at  the  most  basic  level,  a  reanimated  corpse.  More  than  
this,  however,  the  creature  can  be  seen,  as  Harold  
out  of  a  cultural  tradition     whether  troll  or  giant,  gypsy  or  Negro     
.64  He  is  through  his  physicality,  a  
blank   slate   suggestive   of   this   racial   otherness   and   onto   which   this   understanding   has   been  
regularly  and  assertively   inscribed.   Joseph  Lew,   for   instance,   His   "yellow  skin"  
physically   links  him  to  scores  of  millions  of  Bengalis,  whom  the  British   rulers  called  "niggers."  
Like   the   creature's,   their   "lustrous   black,   and   flowing"   hair   and   "pearly  white"   teeth   strongly  
65   ion  seems  here  to  
agree,  in  his  racialised  understanding  of  the  creature,  with  that  of  Mellor  who  claims  that  




the   text  within   a   contemporaneous   framework.  We  know   from  her  diaries   that  Mary   Shelley  
read  widely  and  diversely.   For   the   sake  of   this  argument,  her   reading  of   travel   literature  and  
other  colonial  texts  in  particular,  both  fictional  and  not,  between  1814  and  1817  begs  attention.  
Over   the   period,   both   immediately   prior   to   and   while   she   was   writing   Frankenstein,   Shelley  
Vathek,   Jean-­‐ Incas,   Lady  
                                                                                                                    
63  F.,  V,  55.  
64     
65     













Morgan)  The  Missionary:  An  Indian  Tale   ;  all  works  
of   fiction   which   are   grounded,   to   varying   degrees,   in   the   expansionist   colonial   British  
enterprise.  More  tellingly,  however,  she  read  over  the  same  time,  
the  Macartney  embassy  to  China  in  1792-­‐ History  of  the  West  Indies,  Mungo  
Travels   in   the   Interior   Districts   of   Africa View   of   Hindoostan   and  
History  of  America.67  In     one  
can  see  plainly  reflected  a  development  of  the  types  of  racial  stereotypes  which  are  utilised  by  
both   Lew   and   Mellor.   Mungo   Park 68  descriptions   of   the   various   tribes   living   around   the  
Gambia  for  instance  clearly   s  creature  in  both  his  physical  construction  and  
personality  in  the  text.  Park  writes,  for  example,  of  the  Foulahs,  a  pastoral  West  African  tribe,  
69  While,  of  the  Feloops,  another  tribe  residing  in  the  region,  Park  relates  that  
and  unrelenting  disposition  is,  however,  counterbalanced  by  many  good  qualities:  they  display  
the   utmost   .70  Robertson   and   Edwards  
display  a   similar  
with  his  physical   alterity.   The  diaries  of  Christopher  Columbus,  on  which  both  Robertson  and  
Edwards  draw   strongly,   are   telling   of   this.   He  writes  of   the  American
good   stature      very   handsome   people,   with   hair   not   curly   but   straight   and   coarse,   like  
horsehair,   and  all  of   them  very  wide   in   the   forehead  and  head,  more   so   than  any  other   race  
71  
,  after  all  Frankenstein  claims  to  have   selected  
                                                                                                                    
67  Mary  W.  Shelley,  The  Journals  of  Mary  Shelley,  1814-­‐1844,  eds.,  Paula  R.  Feldman  and  Diana  Scott-­‐Kilvert  
(Oxford:  Clarendon,  1987),  5-­‐189.  
68  Mungo  Park  was  a  Scottish  explorer  who  led  two  expeditions  into  the  African  interior,  modern  day  Mali  and  
Nigeria,  in  1795  and  1805  and  is  credited  as  being  the  first  Westerner  to  discover  the  Niger  River.  Both  the  account  
of  this  first  expedition  drawn  up  by  Bryan  Edwards  for  the  African  Association  as  well  as  his  own  account  of  the  
expedition  published  in  1799  where  immensely  popular  and  widely  read  at  the  time  and  were  instrumental  in  the  
opening  up  of  Africa  to  the  West.  
69Park,  Travels  in  the  interior  districts  of  Africa,  II,  78.  
70  Ibid.  II,  75-­‐6.  
71  Christopher  Columbus,   c.1450-­‐   The  Faber  Book  of  Exploration:  An  Anthology  













his   features   as   beautiful. 72  Passing   this   it   is   not   difficult   to   find   similarities   between   the  
creature   and   the   savages   presented   by   the   likes   of   Columbus   and   Park.   These   tropes   can  
marshalling  these  stereotypes  as  early  as  1719.  In  Robinson  Crusoe,  Crusoe  relates  the  following  
of  Friday:    
  
colour  of  his  skin  was  not  quite  black,  but  very  tawny;  and  yet  not  of  an  ugly  yellow,  nauseous  
tawny;  as  the  Brazilians  and  Virginians,  and  other  natives  of  America  are;  but  of  a  bright  kind  of  
dun  olive  colour  that  had  in  it  something  very  agreeable,  though  not  very  easy  to  describe.  His  
face  was  round  and  plump;  his  nose  small,  not   flat   like  the  
lips,  and  his  fine  teeth  well  set,  and  white  as  ivory.73  
  
formulation  of  D ation  of  him  within  a  very  definitively  racialised  
s  creation.  
The   creature  mirror
What  is  perhaps  one  of  the  more  striking  results  of  the  physical  construction  of  the  creature  in  
the  text  is  just  how  wide  and  diverse  the  resultant  racial  origins  which  he  has  been  attributed  
are.  Indeed  Malchow  notes  of  the  creature:  
  
The   monster,   it   will   be   seen,   is   not   merely   grotesque,   a   too-­‐roughly   cobbled   together  
simulacrum  of  a  man.  He  is  first,  larger  and  more  powerful  than  his  maker,  and,  secondly,  dark  
and  sinister  in  appearance.  This  suggests  the  standard  description  of  the  black  man  in  both  the  
literature  of  the  West  Indies  and  that  of  West  African  exploration.74  
  
ans   or  
  through  contemporary  representations  of  the  orient  as  diverse  as  
Vatheck The   Missionary:   An   Indian   Tale   View   of  
Hindoostan.   I  would  however  argue  that  any  attempt   to  narrow  down  any  specific   source   for  
   is   not   necessarily   as   useful   for   the  
                                                                                                                    
72  F.,  V,  55.  
73  Daniel  Defoe,  Robinson  Crusoe  (London:  Penguin,  1994),  202.  













purposes  of  my  argument  as  the  fact  that  these  stereotypes  existed  and  are  to  varying  degrees  
utilised  throughout  the  text.  
  
Malchow  argues  that  this  
racial  stereotypes  is  so  pervasive  that  it  extends  so  far  as  to  i
Negroes 75   76  
followed  almost  exclusively  by  more  berries  as  well  as  nuts  and  roots77  which  he  roasts.78  The  
colossal   vegetarian   myth,   while   seeming   attractive,   is   however   balanced   by   stereotyping   in  
ur  of  
the  savage,  or  in  this  
brother,   certainly   levels   this   accusation   when   he   encounters   the   creature,   exclaiming,  
Monster 79  
Frankenst 80  This  presentation  of  the  savage  as  
cannibal  was  at  this  point  firmly  established  as  a  trope,  not  only  in  exploration  narratives,  but  
also  embedded   in  the  collective  popular  consciousness  of   the   time  through   its  appearance   in  
Robinson  Crusoe,   interestingly  the  text  prescribed  by  Godwin  to  be  used   in  
the  education  of  children,  abounds  with  examples  of  cannibalistic  savages.  At  one  point  early  
on  Xury,  telling  Crusoe  to  remain   in  the  boat  whil
                                                                                                                    
75  ibid,  71  
76  F.,  XI,  98.  See  also  Timothy  Morton,  Shelley  and  the  Revolution  in  Taste:  the  Body  and  the  Natural  World  
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1994),  47-­‐
  
77  F.,  XI,  100.  
78   -­‐based  
creates  so  painful  a  longing  for  salt,  that  no  words  can  sufficiently  de Travels  in  the  interior  districts  
of  Africa,  XXI,  251),  examples  of  a  diet  which  consists  of  meat  are  if  anything  more  frequent  in  his  narrative.  He  
are  not  over  nice  in  articles  of  diet,  rats,  moles,  squirrels,  snakes,  locusts,  &c.  are  eaten  without  scruple  by  the  
highe Ibid
Ibid,  XXI,  251),  as  well  as  accounts  of  
-­‐ Ibid,  XXI,  252).  The  accreditation  of  the  
vegetarian  savage  to  Park,  I  would  thus  pose  as  being  somewhat  misleading.  
79  F.,  XVI,  137.  













ill  both  go,  and  if  the  wild  mans  come,  
81  More   so   than  mere   suspicion  of   cannibalism  
Crusoe   later   relates   th
having   taken   any   prisoners,   would   bring   them   over   to   the   shore,   where,   according   to   their  
82  This   myth   and   its  
cont
cannibalistic   savage,   he   is   presented   as   adhering   metaphorically   to   this   mould.   A   parallel   is  
Edwards  in  his  depiction  of  the  West  Indians.  Edwards  writes  of  a  slave  uprising  that,    
  
in  which  eight  or  ten  White  
people  were  in  bed,  every  one  of  whom  they  butchered  in  the  most  savage  manner,  and  literally  
morning   they   murdered   between   thirty   and   forty   White,   not   sparing   even   infants   at   the  
breast.83    
  
The  burning  of  the  buildings  and  the  murder  of  children  certainly  mirror  the  crimes  committed  
  P eature  in  this  light  are,  however,  
s   accusations,   the   creature   cannot   fairly   be  
charged  with  cannibalism.  In  fact,  despite  his  later  violent  nature  and  the  murders  he  commits,  
he,   as   far   as   diet   goes,   displays   far  more   in   common  with   the   peace
not   strictly   adhere   to   that   described   by   Park.   Perhaps   it   is   with   this   in   mind   that  Malchow  
argues  that  the  creature  presents  a  striking  parallel  to  the  picture  painted  by  many  apologists  
.84  
certainly  be  argued  to  reflect  this  viewpoint.  
  
                                                                                                                    
81  Defoe,  Robinson  Crusoe,  30.  
82  Ibid,  162.  
83  Brian  Edwards,  History,  Civil  and  Commercial,  of  the  West  Indies,  2  vols.  (Dublin:  Luke  White,  1793),  II.  60-­‐1.  













This  draws  on  a  long  European  tradition  which  imagined  wild  men  or  natural  men  of  the  wood  
-­‐century  
naturalists  helped  to  merge  with  that  of  the  more  primitive  races  of  men  abroad  far  down  the  
ladder  of  racial  hierarchy.85        
  
What  this  diverse  understanding  of  the  creature  demonstrates,  is  not  that  the  creature  is  either  
   American,   Bengali   or   African,   but   rather   it  
highlights   the   extent   to  which   he   has   become   a   vehicle   for   these   stereotypes.   It   is   certainly  
difficult   to   argue   against   any   of   these   readings   of   the   creature,   although   the   cannibalistic  
tendencies  are  to  a  large  extent  metaphorical.  Rather  what  becomes  apparent  is  the  extent  to  
which  these  various  racial  stereotypes  were  current  in  the  early  nineteenth  century.    
  
The  racialisation  of  the  creature  places  the  text,  in  keeping  with  Spiva
of   imperial  discourse   in   reading   literature  of   the   time,  within   this   imperial  discourse  of   racial  
othering.  So  much  so,  that  purely  on  the  basis  of  his  physical  appearance,  Frankenstein  asserts  
what  he  sees  to  be  an   innate  evil   in  the  creature,  excl iming   bhorred  monster!  Fiend  that  
86  This  
perception  of  evil   is,  however,   informed,   initially  at   least,  as  a  result  of  his  appearance  rather  
than   any   innate   evil   in   his   nature. 87   Indeed,   the   creature   understands   this   saying   to  
Frankenstein,   88  before  placing  his  hands  over  his  eyes   and  
entreating  him  to   listen  to  him.  This  highlights  one  of  two  possibilities,  either  the  text   is  here  
89  or  following  the  popularly  held  
  
  
theory  held  that  the  contours  of  the  skull  determines  character  and  moral  nature90    
  
                                                                                                                    
85  ibid,  71.  
86  ibid,  95.  
87Importantly  Frankenstein  sees  the  creature  as  an  evil  monster  even  before  he  murders  his  brother,  displaying  a  
  
88  ibid,  97.  
89   Frankenstein   













These   theories,   if  nothing  else,   seem  to  explain  the  reactions  of   the  various  characters   in   the  
novel  to  the  creature.  Throughout  the  text  he  is  predominantly  judged  as  being  evil  on  the  basis  
of  his  physical  appearance.  The  old  blind  man  De  Lacey  does,  however,  raise  the  possibility  that  
by   removing   visual   perception,      be   viewed   as   European,   human,  
educated  and  even  virtuous.   Indeed  even  Walton,  despite   seeing   the   creature,  by   closing  his  
eyes,   is  able  to  recollect  himself  so  far  as  to  engage  with  him
horrible  as  his   face,  of   such   loathsome,  yet  appalling  hideousness.   I   shut  my  eyes  voluntarily,  
and  endeavoured   to   recollect  what  were  my  duties  with   regard   to   this  destroyer.   I   called  on  
91  This  approach  by  no  means  resolves  the  issue  of  the  nature  of  the  creature  for  
Walton ,   if   anything,   only   serve   to   reinforce   an  
understanding  of  the  creature  as  somatically  other.  The  text  demonstrates  here  the  possibilities  
of  overcoming  prejudice  based  on  somatic  difference  by  presenting  the  
in   a   context   where   this   alterity   is   not   immediately   apparent.   It   is   just   this,   however,   which  
serves   to   further   emphasise  his  physical  difference,   for   it   is   only   in   such  a   context  where   his  














                                                                                                                    
















Partha   Chatterjee,   writing   on   the   First   Indian   War   of   Independence   in   1857,92  argues   that  
fulfil  
its  normalizing  mission  because  the  premise  of  its  power  was  the  preservation  of  the  alienness  
93  In  keeping  with  this,  Anne  Mellor  argues  that,  
  
In  Frankenstein,   human  beings   typically   construe   the   unfamiliar,   the   abnormal,   the   unique   as  
dangerous   or   evil,   a   construction   given   form   in   their   language.   As   Foucault   suggested   in  
Madness  and  Civilization,  language  is  an  instrument  of  power,  establishing  and  policing  a  myriad  
the  terrors  of  the  unknown.94    
  
The  other  becomes  here  a  tool  not  only   in  the  process  of  self-­‐definition  but  similarly  through  
the  definition  of  and  exclusion  of  this  self-­‐same  other,  a  tool  for  the  assertion  of  the  supremacy  
of  the  defining  party.   acism  emerged  as  a  discourse  to  assert  the  
superiority  of  Western  Christians  and  as  a   justification  for   land  appropriation  and  exploitation  
95  This   holds   valence   for   it   becomes   only   through   the  
categorisation,   definition   and   exclusion   of   an   other   that   this   concept   of   collective   superior  
identity  can  be  achieved.  More     against  
,   a   distinction  which   requires   an   implicit   imbalance   between   the  
said   parties   in   order   to   function   as   a   vehicle   for   the   type   of   imperial   discourse   inherent   in  
Frankenstein.      
  
                                                                                                                    
92  The  issues  inherent  in  the  colonial  administration  of  India  discussed  here  by  Chatterjee  are  issues  which,  for  the  
most  part,  find  their  root  in  the  late  18th  century.  While  historically  later,  the  Revolt  of  1857  was  in  many  ways  the  
product  of  the  misrule  in  India  of  the  East  India  Company  in  the  late  18th  and  early  19th  century  as  well  as  the  initial  
rapid  expansion  of  the  Company  Army  by  Warren  Hastings  in  1772.    
93  Partha  Chatterjee,   The  Nation  and  Its  Fragments:  Colonial  and  Post-­‐Colonial  Histories.  
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1993),  18.  
94   Frankenstein ,  22.  
95  Walter  D.  Mignolo,   ,  in  Rereading  the  Black  
Legend:  The  Discourses  of  Religious  and  Racial  Difference  in  the  Renaissance  Empires,  eds.  Margaret  R.  Greer,  













In  this  light,  one  can  begin  to  see  in  Frankenstein  how  within  this  discourse,  the  barbarian,  the  
monster,  the  other,  more  specifically,  that  which  is  not  what  we  are,  is  formulated  ideologically  
as   an   important   model   of   comparison   against   which   the   idea   of   European   society   can   be  
formulated  and  evaluated.96  
essayist,   Michel   de   Montaigne,   called   attention   to   the   relativism   and,   by   implication,   the  
ideological  tenor  of  this  impulse  to  identify  an  inferior  opposite,  writing  that   [e]ach  man  calls  
barbarism  whatever  is  not  his  own  practice. 97  Perhaps  what  is  more  telling  is  that  in  Latin  the  
word  barbarus,  means  foreign,  strange  or  even  a  foreigner  or  a  stranger.98  The  colonial  project  
alluded  to  by  Chatterjee  and  its  inherent  racism  highlighted  by  Mignolo  is,  in  keeping  with  this,  
predicated   on   the   idea   that   the   foreigner   functions   through   their   encoded   barbarism   to  
validate,   in   this   instance,   the  European   system,   its   identity,  morals   and  above  all   superiority.  
Written  two  centuries  after  Montaigne  Shelley   creates  a  scenario  which  is  able  to  bring  
the   mechanics   of   this   system   to   light   and   through   doing   so   bring   it,   to   some   degree,   into  
question.    
  
The   creature   is   thus   construed   from   early   on   in   relation   to   Frankenstein.   The   significance,  
therefore,   of   ,   a   savage  
inhabitant  of   some  undiscovered   island.    should  not  escape  notice.  His  description   functions,  
though  subtly  at  this  point,  as  an  allusion  to  this  binary  understanding  of  the  other  within  the  
text   as   well   as   an   assertion   of   the   difference   between   the   two.   It   is,   however,   not   an  
empowered  assertion  of  difference  on  the  part  of  the  creature  but  rather  one  informed  by  his  
perceived  inferiority.  As  Myra  Jehlen  charts  it,  the  notion  of   difference   allows  for  a  break  with  
the   traditionally   monologic   encounter   between   the   subject   of   colonial   discourse   and   the  
European   centre   in   which   cultural   agency   can   be   reclaimed   by   the   subject   of   this   discourse  
through  an  assertion  of  just  this:  difference.99  I  would  like  to  suggest  that  through  his  exposure  
                                                                                                                    
96  
not   ,  277,  for  a  fuller  exposition  of  this  idea.  
97  Michel  E.  Montaigne,   ,  in  The  Complete  Essays  of  Montaigne,  trans.  Donald  M.  Frame  (Stanford:  
Stanford  University  Press,  1965),  I(31),  152.  
98  Charlton  T.  Lewis  and  Charles  Short,  eds.  A  Latin  Dictionary  (Oxford:  The  Clarendon  Press,  1907)  222.  













of  the  De  Laceys,  the  Western  aesthetic  conception  of  self,  positing  himself  as  the  other  of  the  
encounter   as   a   result   of   his   physical   alterity.   Once   he   recognises   himself   as   different,   he  
100  
101  convincing  himself  that  
102   103  This   is  not  to  say  
that      passively   accepts   this   deformity.   He,   as   the   story   progresses,  
come  to  the  fore  in  his  demand  for  the  construction  of  a  mate.  He  reflects  at  this  point,  
alone   and  miserable;   man  will   not   associate   with  me;   but   one   as   deformed   and   horrible   as  
myself  would  not  deny  herself  to  me.  My  companion  must  be  of  the  same  species104  and  have  
105  His  revelation  at  this  point  is  that  he  is,  just  he  has  previously  lamented,  
106  By  at  this  moment  asserting  his   difference ,  being  
   to   in   some   sense   partake   actively   in   this  
discourse,   forcing  a  shift   towards  dialogical  exchange.   In  much  this  way,  Jehlen  writes  that  by  
  one  would  not  only  represent  the  very  meaning  of  
alienation  but  be  incapable  of  further  self-­‐definition  and  even  speech;  while  to  declare  oneself  
   leads   logically   to   self-­‐description,   even  monologue. 107  The   assertion   of   difference  
enables   the   introduction   of   a   discourse  which   is   dialogic.   This   allows   for   some   semblance   of  
agency  on     who,  through  this  claim  to  difference,  is  able  
to  position  himself   as   an   active  participant   in   the  process  of   self-­‐definition.   It   introduces   the  
possibility   of   dialogic   subjectivity108  into   the   discourse.   In   other   words   he   should   be   able   to  
                                                                                                                    
100  F.,  XII,  109.  
101  ibid  
102  ibid  
103  ibid,  XIII,  116.  
104  My  emphasis  
105  ibid,  XVI,  139.  
106  ibid,  XIII,  116.  
107     
108   The  Dialogic  Imagination:  Four  Essays,  ed.  Michael  Holquist  
(Austen:  University  of  Texas  Press,  1981),  259-­‐ A  Companion  to  
Romanticism,  ed.  Duncan  Wu  (Oxford:  Blackwell  Publishers,  2001).  The  term  dialogic  finds  its  origin  i













vice  versa.    
  
I   would,   however,   suggest   that   in   Frankenstein,   this   dialogism   is   infelicitous,   as,   the  
establishment   of   this   difference ,   is   problematic   in   a   context   in  which   the   identities   of   the  
carriers   and   objects   of   colonial   discourse   have   become   so   intricately   linked   that   in   many  
instances  it  becomes  impossible  to  extract  a  distinct  sense  of  self  untarnished  by  the  imposition  
of  Western   colonial   ideals   upon   the   colonised   subject.  
difference    and   his   distancing   of   himself   from   humanity   can   in   this   way   be   seen   as   an  
inevitably   doomed   enterprise.   His   identity   is   so   couched   in   an   understa ding   of   himself   as  
other,   and   thus   inferior,   that  he   is  destined  never   to   fulfil   any  act  of   empowered  ontological  
self-­‐definition.109  He   is   unable   to   exist   outside   of   his   initial   defining   discourse;   a   discourse  
which,  from  the  European  perspective  at  least,  functions  as  a  means  of  validating  and  justifying  
Importantly  the  difference  which  becomes  for  Jehlen  integral  to  the  construction  of  European  
identity   is   an   enforced   difference   perpetuated   by   the   West.   While   an   active   invocation   of  
,   ,  allow   for  dialogism,   the  difference   inherent   in   colonial  
discourse   restricts   it,   serving   to   justify   the   objectification   and   degradation   of   the   colonial  
It  is  this  difference  therefore  which  categorises,  or  forms  an  understanding  
ithin   his   society,   for   it   is   his   difference  
which   serves   to   justify   his   persecution.   It   is   his   otherness   which   consistently   informs   his  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
context  in  its  construction  of  meaning.  The  meaning  of  any  word  therefore  is  dictated  not  merely  by  the  object  it  
relates  to  but  
with  qualifications  [by]  alien  words  that  ha ibid,  276).  This  process  of  imposition  
in  dialogue  as  rejoinders  to  what  has  been  said  and  what  they  antici
  
109  See  Michel  Foucault,     is     in  The  Foucault  Reader,  ed.  Paul  Rabinow  (New  York:  
Pantheon,  1984);  and  Ian  Hacking,  Historical  Ontology  (Cambridge  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press,  2004),  1-­‐27.    By  
ontological  self-­‐definition  I  am  speaking  to  the  Foucauldian  concepts  which  he  terms  the  axes  of  knowledge  and  
     is   ,  53).  What  this  













interactions   with   society   and   eventually   his   own   understanding   of   self.   In   many   ways   this  
precludes  the  possibility  of  his  inhabiting  a  sense  of  self  informed  by     While  he  at  
times  troubles  this  binary  both  through  active  attempts  at  asserting  his  difference  and  through  
his   intellectual  nature,  as   I  hope   to  demonstrate,  his  physical  otherness   is   so   ingrained   in  his  
understanding  of  self  that  he  is  unable  inevitably  to  move  beyond  this.    
  
The   binary   understanding   of   Frankenstein   and   his   creature   in   the   text   is   informed   by   this  
difference   and   is   made   apparent   from   reasonably   early   on. 110   Interestingly,   however,  
immediately  after  this  binary  is  set  up  Frankenstein  is  portrayed  in  the  text  as  wild  and  savage.  
It   is,   however,   a   savageness  which   inevitably   serves   to  emphasise   rather   than  destabilise   the  
binary
condition. 111  For   two   full   days   he   is   unable   to   even   speak.   Not   only   does   Walton   initially  
believe   him   to   have   been   deprived   of   understanding,112  but   his   descriptions   of   Frankenstein  
become  increasingly  animalistic.  He  writes,    
  
I  never  saw  a  more  interesting  creature:  his  eyes  have  generally  an  expression  of  wildness,  and  
even  madness,  but  there  are  moments  when,   if  any  one  performs  an  act  of  kindness   towards  
him  or  does  him  any  the  most  trifling  service,  his  whole  countenance   is   lighted  up,  as   it  were,  
with   a   beam   of   benevolence   and   sweetness   that   I   never   saw   equalled.   But   he   is   generally  
melancholy  and  despairing,  and  sometimes  he  gnashes  his  teeth.113  
  
Frankenstein  is  depicted  by  Walton  as  a  
behaves  as  such,  gnashing  his  teeth  but  also   reacting  to  acts  of  kindness   in  a  very  animalistic  
.114  This  must  certainly  strike  one  as  somewhat  strange  
considering  the  all-­‐ ,  
with  both  the  idea  of  the  Noble  Savage  as  well  as  the  more  developed  figure  of  Emile  presented  
by  Rousseau.   It   is   certainly   conspicuous   that   such   a   reversal   of   the   idealistic   European   takes  
                                                                                                                    
110  A  relationsh   
111  F.,  letter  iv,  24.  
112  Ibid,  25.  
113  ibid  













place  so  soon  after  the  establishment  of  the  definitive  negation  of  savage  identity  through  the  
  
seemed  to  be,  a  savage  inhabitant  of  some  undiscovered  island,  but  a  European. 115  
    
Quite  significantly,   savage  nature,  when  he  is  found  by  Walton,  is  not  
natural,  being  brought  on  rather  through  intense  and  prolonged  exposur
limbs   were   nearly   frozen,   and   116  
117  Frankenstein   is   in   fact   in   so   severe  a   state   that  he   is  even  deprived  of   speech   for  
two  full  days.  This  
regard  to  the  differences  which  he  had  perceived  between  himself  and  the  other  people  he  has  
come   ist  
upon  coarser  diet;  I  bore  extremes  of  heat  and  cold  with  less  injury  to  my  frame;  my  stature  far  
118  As  Malchow  has  highlighted,  the  key  to  this  understanding  of  the  creature  
is   ical  attributes  of  the  monster  are  
his   ape-­‐like   ability   to   scamper   up   mountainsides   and   his   endurance   of   temperatures   which  
119  The  creature   is   thus  able   to  easily  survive   the  same  
extreme   temperatures   which   render   Frankenstein   first   unconscious   then   crazed   and   finally  
dead.   Upon   catching   sight   of   him   moving   across   the   ice,   Walton   even   remarks   of   his   rapid  
progress,  with  little  or  even  no  perceived  difficulty.120  The  text  plays  upon  the  widespread  belief  
not  only  physically  stronger  than  Europeans  but  also  were  able  withstand  
the  extreme   temperatures   of   the   tropics  which  had   in   some   circumstances   the   power   to   kill  
Europeans.121    
  
                                                                                                                    
115  ibid,  24.  
116  ibid  
117  ibid  
118  ibid,  XIII,  116.  
119     
120  F.,  letter  iv,  23.  
121  See  John  Davis,  Travels  of  Four  and  a  Half  in  the  United  States  of  America;  During  1789,  1799,  1800  and  1802  
(New  York:  H.  Holt  and  co.,  1803),  Davis  makes  just  this  point  in  his  Travels  in  the  United  States  of  America  (Davis,  













Though   postdating   Frankenstein   Nikolai   Przhevalsky   writes   of   the   Mongolians   that   while  
accompanying   tea   caravans,   they   could   withstand   temperatures   in   excess   of   -­‐20   degrees  
trained  from  early  childhood  to  endure  hards 122  
their  extreme  perhaps  heat  and  cold  may  determine  the  character  of  nations,  of  the  negroes  
for   example   on   the   one   side,   and   the   Laplanders   on   the   other. 123  
creature   was   not   brought   up   in   these   extreme   temperatures   nor   conditioned   to   withstand  
them,  he  is  nevertheless  endowed  with  a  similar  racial  constitution  to  that  alluded  to  by  both  
Godwin  and  Przhevalsky.  He  is,  larger,  faster,  stronger  and  more  resilient  to  the  elements.  
  
Frankenstein   relates,   on   sighting   his   creation   following   his   descent   from   the   summit   of  
advancing   towards  me  with   superhuman  speed.  He  bounded  over   the  crevices  of   ice,   among  
which  I  had  walked  with  caution;  his  stature,  also,  as  he  approached  seemed  to  exceed  that  of  
124  This   would   certainly   reinforce   an   understanding   of   Frankenstein   and   his   creation   in  
increasingly   racialised   terminology   stereotypical   of   the   time.   One   can   see   how,   just   as   the  
ancient   barbarian   was   anyone   who   was   not   Greek,   the   creature   is   construed   here   as   being  
extra-­‐European.   In   this   light,   for  the  West,   the  problem  of  self-­‐definition   is  predicated  on  the  
exclusion   of   all   who   differ   in   any   way   from   the   perceive
creature  becomes  therefore  the  vehicle  through  which  one  can  explore  how  these  formulations  
function,   as   he   is   faced   in   the   text   with   the   difficulty   of   reconciling   his   seemingly   contrary  
physical  and  intellectual  identities.    
  
What  does  however  become  apparent   is  a  certain  degree  of  development  with  regard  to  this  
particular  prejudice.  This  is  particularly  pertinent  once  the  creature  is  able  to  recognise  himself  
physically   within   these   binary   terms.   From   the   perspective   of   the   creature   there   exist   no  
                                                                                                                    
122  Nikolai  Przhevalsky,   -­‐ The  Faber  Book  of  Exploration:  An  Anthology  of  Worlds  
Revealed  By  Explorers  Through  the  Ages,  ed.  Benedict  Allen  (London:  Faber  and  Faber,  2002),  217.  
123  William  Godwin,  Enquiry  Concerning  Political  Justice  (London:  Penguin,  1985),  151.    













knowledge  structures  at  the  beginning  of  his  life  which  place  him  as  different.  Once  however  he  
has  spent  some  time  observing  the  De  Laceys  he  perceives  his  reflection  in  a  pool  of  water  and  
recognising   its   difference   from   that   of   the   De   Laceys,   who   he   has   at   this   point   begun   to  
establish  an  emotional  connection  with,  is  revolted  by  it.  The  creature  recollects  how  he  was,  
  
terrified  when  I  viewed  myself  in  a  transparent  pool!  At  first  I  stared  back,  unable  to  believe  that  
it  was  indeed  I  who  was  reflected  in  the  mirror;  and  when  I  became  fully  convinced  that  I  was  in  
reality   the   monster   that   I   am,   I   was   filled   with   the   bitterest   sensation   of   despondence   and  
mortification125    
  
The   creature   is   shown   here   to   only   begin   to   see   himself   as   a  monster   once   he   has   actually  
physically  seen  himself.  Importantly  however  he  is  only  revolted  by  his  appearance  because  he  
has   begun   at   this  point   to   form   a   connection  with   the  De   Laceys,   thus   identifying  with   their  
appearance.   This   moment   of   self-­‐awareness   begins   the   process   by   which   the   creature  
eventually  comes  to  the  full  knowledge  of  his  alterity.  This  
identity   is   only,   however,   made   apparent   through   his   eventual   internalisation   of   European  
aesthetic  ideals,  an  education  which  comes  at  the  hands  of  the  unknowing  De  Lacey  family.  He  
   their  grace,  beauty,  and  delicate  
126  That  this  understanding  of  their  physical  form  comes  simultaneously  with  his  
process   of   positive   identification   with   the   De   Laceys,   is   telling.   He   establishes   an   emotional  
connection   with   them   through   his   first   winter:  
when  they  rejoiced,   I  sympathized   in  thei 127  This  emotional  connection   in  turn  informs  
his  imagined  idea  of  self  and  his  eventual  horror  upon  catching  sight  of  his  own  reflection  in  a  
pool  of  water,  as  his   imagined  self   is  at  odds  with  the  reality  of  his  own  physical  appearance.  
Having   seen  
significantly   outside   of   the   gestalt   representing  his   experience   and   understanding   of  physical  
identity  and  norms.  He  relates  that   128  
he   cannot   but   understand   his   own   somatic  make   up   as   existing   outside   of   these   norms.   On  
                                                                                                                    
125  ibid,  XII,  109.  
126  ibid  
127  Ibid,  108.  













seeing  his  reflect t  first  I  stared  back,  unable  to  believe  that  it  was  indeed  I  
who  was   reflected   in   the  mirror;  and  when   I  became   fully   convinced   that   I  was   in   reality   the  
129  
  mirror   stage,   however,   the   disjuncture   or   fracturing   of   the   imagined   and   real  
unified   ego,   fractures   his   already   largely   developed   sense   of   self   which   has   been   developed  
ontological   violence   as   he   is   forced   to   come   to   terms  with   his   physical   identity  which   exists  
outside   of   his   own   imagined   community  which   he   has   formed   vicariously  with   the  De   Lacey  
family.  He  becomes  in  this  moment  aware  of  his  somatic  divergence  from  the  European  norm,  
established  in  his  mind  by  the  De  Laceys.  
130  He  partakes  at  this  point  in  an  active  ontological  fracturing  of  his  identity,  
a  process  which  is  only  furthered  once  he  is  exposed  to  literature  and  becomes,  through  this,  to  
e   Rousseauean   sense   of   the  word131  and   is   able   to   place   his  












                                                                                                                    
129  ibid,  XII,  109.  
130  ibid  
131  This  is  meant  in  reference  to  the  project  of  education  set  out  by  Rousseau  in  Emile,  an  education  which  is  for  
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the  Antilles  in  the  early  1950s  that   n  the  magazines  the  Wolf,  the  Devil,  the  Evil  Spirit,  the  Bad  
Man,  the  Savage  are  always  sy 132  He  argues  
is  always   identification  with  the  victor,   the   little  Negro,  quite  as  easily  as   the   little  white  boy,  
becomes  an  explorer,   who  faces  the  danger  of  being  eaten  by  the  
wicked  Negroes. 133  He  writes,  in  a  continuation  of  this  initial  argument,  
     
   identifies  himself  with  the  explorer,   the  bringer  of  civilization,   the  white  man  who  
carries   truth   to   savages     an  all-­‐white   truth.  There   is   identification      that   is,   the  young  Negro  
observe   in   the   young  
Antillean  the  formation  and  crystallization  of  an  attitude  and  a  way  of  thinking  and  seeing  that  
are  essentially  white.134        
  
   Fanon   is  
arguing   here   against   popular   culture   for   its   ontological   role   in   the   formation   of   racialised  
identity  from  an  early  age.  Comic  books  become  in  this  way  as  dangerous  to  the  local  cultures  
as   the   more   obvious,   active   forms   of   cultural   imperialism   employed   under   the   guise   of  
civilisation,   religious   and   moral   teachings   and   education   in   general.   The   reason   why   comic  
books  are   isolated  here  by  Fanon  as  an   important  example  of  this  cultural   imperialism   is  that  
they  differ  in  a  significant  manner  from  the  above  mentioned  tools  of  overt  imperialism,135  that  
is,   that   the   imperialism   represented   by   comic   books   is   consumed   voluntarily   by   the   local  
populous.   The   child   is   actively   shaped   therefore   through   his   consumption   of   media   which  
                                                                                                                    
132  Franz  Fanon,   ,  in  Black  Skin,  White  Masks  (London:  Pluto,  2008),  146.    
133  ibid  
134  Ibid,  147-­‐8.  
135  By  overt  imperialism,  I  am  referring  to  the  more  active  forms  which  imperialism  takes  as  opposed  to  the  subtle  
are  consumed  freely  by  the  local  populace  who  participate  in  this  process  voluntarily.  It  must  however  be  noted  
that  these  categories  become  to  a  large  extent  contingent  on  the  manner  in  which  all  of  the  above  mentioned  
forms  of  imperialism;  education,  literature,  religion,  etc.,  are  employed,  or  just  as  importantly  not,  consciously  at  
least,  employed.  It  can,  in  some  ways,  be  said  that  the  terms  overt  and  oblique  become  therefore  dependent  not  
on  the  form  which  they  take  but  rather  the  intention,  or  lack  thereof  which  underlies  the  deployment  of  that  self-­‐













promotes   sympathy   and   identification   with   the   white   man   and   just   as   importantly,   the  
devaluation   of      This   is   not   to   claim   that  
Frankenstein   as   a   text  
ht   year   old  Antillean   child   in  his   subjection   to   the  
self-­‐same   oblique   form   of   imperialist   discourse   through   his   education.136  Both   language   and  
education   become   therefore   key   to   this   reading   of   the   text.   In   Frankenstein   the   power   of  
language  is  made  increasingly  apparent  as  the  text  progresses,  most  obviously,  for  it  is  through  
language   that   the   creature   is   exposed   to   the   various  power   structures   and   definitions  which  
make  up  this  discourse:  a  discourse  which  labels  him  as  other.  Nevertheless  the  realisation  of  
his  alterity   in   turn   fuels  his  desire   to  master   language,  which  he   sees  as  having   the  power   to  
transcend  his  somatic  difference,  a  desire  he  relates  to  Frankenstein.  He  tells  him,    
  
I  easily  perceived  that,  although  I  eagerly  longed  to  discover  myself  to  the  cottagers,  I  ought  not  
to  make  the  attempt  until  I  had  first  become  master  of  th ir  language,  which  knowledge  might  
enable  me   to  make   them  overlook   the  deformity  of  my   figure;   for  with   this   also   the  contrast  
perpetually  presented  to  my  eyes  had  made  me  acquainted.137      
  
The   creature  wants   here   to   learn   language,  much   as   the   Antillean   young   boy  wants   to   read  
Western  comic  books.  He   is  actively  attempting  to   insert  himself   into  European   language  and  
consequently  European  culture.  As  he  sees  it,  at  this  point  in  the  text,  language  has  the  power  
. 138  Peter  Brooks  argues   in   line  with  
the   creature   himself   that      for   a   deficient  
nature. 139  As  the  novel  progresses,  however,  his  exposure  to  language,  rather  than  addressing  
this  deficiency  in  the  eyes  of  society,  only  serves  to  further  highlight,  in  his  mind,     
own   otherness.   The   text   demonstrates   how   comes  
integrally  linked  with  his  somatic  difference.  His  physical  makeup  prompts  his  initial  learning  of  
language  but   just  as   importantly,  once  he  has  acquired   it,   as   John  Bugg  highlights,  
                                                                                                                    
136  Initially  linguistically  then  later  through  literature  and  culture.  
137  F.,  XII,  109.  
138  ibid  
139  Peter  Brooks,   The  Endurance  of  
Frankenste ,  eds.  George  Levine  and  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher  (Berkeley:  University  of  













. 140  What  Shelley   demonstrates  here  
is   the   implicit   connection  between   language,  as   the  vehicle   for  discourse,  and  the  process  of  
othering  that  underlies  the  power  structures  of  the  colonial  system.    
  
On  seeing  his  reflection  in  a  pool,  the  creature  bec
reality   the   monster   that   I   am. 141  The   creature   is   thus   aware   of   his   alterity   before   the  
acquisition   of   language,   indeed,   as   already   alluded   to;   this   realisation   prompts   his   desire   to  
language. 142  It   is  only   later,  however,  as  he   learns  from  Constantin-­‐
Ruins  of  Empires,  
,143  as  well   as  
[his]   fellow   creatures   [ ]   high   and   unsullied   descent   united   by   riches ,144  that   he   begins   to  
reflect  on  his  own  nature   and  his  place  within   society.  His   initial  understanding  of   the  world  
serves   here   as   a   bridge   into   his   reflection   on   his   physical   nature,   prompting   his   previously  
discussed   observation:  
of   none   like  me.  Was   I   then   a  monster,   a   blot  upon   the   earth,   from  which   all  men   fled   and  
whom  all  men  disowned? 145  His  declaration  of  his  own  monstrosity  is  described  in  importantly  
epistemological   terms.   It   becomes   knowledge   of   the   facts   of   his   existence   not   the   fact   itself  
agony  that  these  reflections  inflicted  upon  me;  I  tried  to  dispel  them,  but  sorrow  only  increased  




                                                                                                                    
140  John   :  Education  and  Exile  in     Huntington  Library  
Quarterly,  68:4  (2005):659.  
141  F.,  XII,  109.  
142  Ibid  
143  ibid,  XIII,  115.  
144  ibid  
145  Ibid,  116.  
146  ibid  













Emile,   for,  we  are,  according  to   knowing  
nothing,  perceiving  nothing.  The  mind,  bound  up  within  imperfect  and  half  grown  organs,  it  is  
148  What  this  aphoristic  appreciation  of  human  knowledge  
displays   on   the   part   of   Rousseau,   is   a   philosophy   or   understanding   of   epistemology   and,   in  
Emile,   education   which   is   strikingly   similar   to   that   put   forth   in   Frankenstein.   It   represents   a  
philosophy  of  knowledge  predicated  on  a  markedly  Lockean  empiricism.149  That   is  to  say,  that  
for   Rousseau,   people   are   born   in   many   ways   free   of   what   one   would   generally   refer   to   as  
human   nature,   as   moral   and   intellectual   tabulae   rasae.   Rousseau   justifies   this   through   a  
thought  experiment   in  which  he  postulates   the  existence  of  a  being  who   is  brought   into   life,  
  as  a  fully  developed  adult.  He  speculates:              
  
Suppose  a  child  born  with  the  size  and  strength  of  manhood,  entering  upon  life  full  grown  like  Pallas  from  
nothing,  he  would  recognize  no  one,  he  could  not  turn  his  
eyes  towards  what  he  wanted  to  see;  not  only  would  he  perceive  no  external  object,  he  would  not  even  
be  aware  of   sensation   through   the   several   sense  organs.   [ ]   all   his   sensations  would  be  united   in  one  
or  rather  this  feeling,  would  be  the  only  thing  in  which  he  excelled  an  ordinary  child.150  
  
Pallas   Athena   exhibits   here   a   marked   similarity   to   Frankenstein
creature:  i   Athena
the  world,  characterised  here  by  sensory  confusion.  This   initial  experience   is  not  dissimilar   to  
the   .151  In   his   account   of   what   the  
152  
                                                                                                                    
148  Rousseau,  Emile,  I.  28.  
149  See  John  Locke,  An  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  ed.  Peter  H.  Nidditch  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  
Locke:  A  Very  Short  Introduction  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  
Press,  1984).  For  Locke,  all  knowledge  is  contingent  on  empirical  observation  and  experience  of  the  world  and  men  
,  106  and  310-­‐12)  mediated  through  rational  interrogation  of  
this  sensory  experience  of  the  world  (ibid,  100,  264  and  704)  .  His  emphasis  on  sensory  perception  is  predicated  in  
some  sense  on  his  religious  c
cussed  in  greater  length  in  due  course.        
150  Rousseau,  Emile,  I.  28.  
151   Emile  to  Frankenstein   













the  same  time. 153  His  birth  is  an  explosion  of  sense  perception  so  profound  it  would  seem  that  
he  is  not  able  to  distinguish  between  the  different  senses  for  some  time.  It   is  perhaps  for  this  
rea t   is  with   considerable  difficulty   that   I   remember   the  
original  era  of  my  being;  all  the  events  of  th 154  For,  as  
the  creature   relates a  strange  multiplicity  of   sensations  seized  me   [...]  and   it  was,   indeed,  a  
155  His  
world-­‐view   is   created   initially   then   through   empirical   observation.   A   number   of   pages   are  
dedicated   to   the   description   of   the   creature   subsequent   coming   to   terms   with   his   world  
through   sight,   smell   and   touch   in   particular.   He   has   it   would   seem,   in   this   presentation,   no  
innate  qualities  or  discernible  nature  other  than  his  being  both   inquisitive  and  driven  by  base  
needs  such  a  hunger156  and  freedom  from  pain.157    
  
   displays,   then,   is   a  
similarity   to   Frankenstein   in   many   ways   more   important   than   that   of   content.   It   suggests   a  
social   understanding   of   epistemology   and   perhaps   more   tellingly   of   morality.   This  
creature    the   process   of   his   moral  
development.158  In   this   vein,  Chapter  XIII  of  Frankenstein  
NOW  hasten  to  the  more  moving  part  of  my  story.  I  shall  relate  events  that  impressed  me  with  
159  This  marks  a  development  
from   his   description   of   his   original   experience   of   the   world.   The   move   is   one   from   an  
understanding  of  the  world  on  purely   sensory   terms  to  one  characterised  by  a  more  abstract  
understanding  of  the  world;  one  with  the  beginnings  of  a  world  view,  premised  not  merely  on  
sensual  perception  but  rather  an  emotive  one.    




156  ibid,  99-­‐101.  
157  ibid,  100  and  101.  
158  I  use  development  rather  than  the  generally  favoured  degeneration  here  on  the  basis  of  an  understanding  of  
the  creature  as  coming  into  the  world  as  an  amoral  creature.  














  experiences  of  it  
into  his  education.  This   is  perhaps  most  evident   in  his  early  experience  of   the  De  Laceys  and  
informs  his  early  understanding  of   language.  His  first  sighting  of  the  family  teleologically  hints  
towards  the  manner  in  which  he  will  consequently  learn  language.  He  observes  Agatha,  noting  
160   
161  He  is  able  on  the  basis  of  this  to  understand,  although  in  a  very  rudimentary  
fashion,   somethi e   can   recognise,   on   the   basis   of   their  
apparent   emotions,   that   the   sounds  which   Felix   is  making  
162  
  
163  His   observation   of   the   De   Laceys   is,   in   light   of   this,   couched   in   the  
creature    perception   of   emotion   and   his   emotional   understanding   of   the   cottagers.   It   is  
significant   that  during  his   first  day  of  observing   them,   the  old  man,  on  playing  and   singing   is  
able  to  illicit  not  only  strong  emotions  from  his  children  but  also  from  the  creature.    
  
He  played  a  mournful  air  which  I  perceived  drew  tears  from  the  eyes  of  his  amiable  companion,  
of   which   the   old   man   took   no   notice,   until   she   sobbed   audibly;   he   then   pronounced   a   few  
sounds,  and  the  fair  creature,  leaving  her  work  knelt  at  his  feet.  He  raised  her  and  smiled  with  
such  kindness  and  affection  that  I  felt  sensations  of  a  peculiar  and  over-­‐powering  nature;  they  
were   a   mixture   of   pain   and   pleasure,   such   as   I   had   never   before   experienced,   either   from  
hunger   or   cold,   warmth   or   food;   and   I   withdrew   from   the   window,   unable   to   bear   these  
emotions.164    
  
Through  his  experience  of   the  old  man ormance  the  creature   first  observes   the  
emotions   of   the   cottagers   and   then   vicariously   participates   in   this   self-­‐same   emotional  
interaction.  Through  this  he  begins  to  form  a  connection  with  the  family.  It  is  telling  therefore  
that  he  is  exposed  to  language  through  song  at  an  early  stage  for  it  serves  as  a  more  potent,  in  
his   eyes,   carrier   of   emotion   and   thus   aids   his   later   understanding   of   language.   Indeed,   this  
                                                                                                                    

















passage   contrasts  
s
165  By   varying   degrees   however   he   is   able   to   begin  
making  connections  between  these  sounds  and  their  meaning.   In  Saussurean  terms  he  is  able  
to  make  the  connection  between  the  signified  and  the  signifier.  His  empirical  observation  and  
to   some  degree  his   vicarious  participation     
language  in  which  the  concepts  are  signified  by  objects  first,  but  then  later  by  various  emotions.  
Through   constant   repetition   of   sound   patterns   he   is   subsequently   able   to   link   the   audible  
that  these  people  possessed  a  method  of  communicating  their  experience  and  feelings  to  one  
166  This   presents   a   significant   movement   in   the   mind   of   the  
creature   in  which  he   is  able  to  move  from  a  phonetic  understanding  of   language167  towards  a  
locutionary   one.   He  
space  of  several  revolutions  of  the  moon  in  my  hovel,  I  discovered  the  names  that  were  given  
168  This  prompts  his  learning  of  the  names  of  
the  cottagers  as  well  as  those  of  some  of  the  more  basic  objects  which  they  interact  with  on  a  
fir   I  learned  also  the  
names  of  the  cottagers  themselves,  but  the  old  man  had     The  girl  
   and   the   you 169  The   creature   then  
relates  
these  sounds  and  was   170  While  he  struggles  at  this  point  to  understand  
.171  It   does   however   take   him   a   little   longer   to   come   to   terms  with   the  more  
                                                                                                                    
165  ibid,  105.  
166  ibid,  XII,  107.  
167  In  other  words  a  lack  of  associative  signified  and  resultantly  a  lack  of  meaning  attached  to  sound  patterns.  
system  of  signification  which  underpins  it,  language  becomes  a  mere  phonetic  exercise.  It  therefore  becomes  at  
this  stage  merely  empty  sound  patterns  devoid  of  meaning.        
168  F.,  XII,  108.  
169  ibid  
170  ibid  














apply   them,   such   172  That   being   said   he   does   understand   the  
s  more  telling   is  his  
understanding  at  this  early  phase  of  the  possibility  of  language  to  effect  these  same  emotions.  
   its  
effect   on   both   his   children   and   himself.   While   he   is   not   perhaps   aware   that   the   denotive  
content   of   the   language  may  have   been   responsible   for   this   reaction   in   the   children,   he   has  
observed   that   the   sounds   which   the   people   are   producing   can   have   strong   emotive   effects.  
Indeed  soon  after  this  he  articulates  this  observation.  The  creature  is,  at  this  point,  aware  of  a  
slightly   more   sophisticated   aspect   of   language:  
sometimes  produced  pleasure  or  pain,  smiles  or  sadness,  in  the  minds  and  countenances  of  the  
hearer 173  One   can   see   how   he   displays   an   awareness   here   of   the   performative   aspect   of  
language.174    
  
[The  old  man]  would   talk   in  a  cheerful  accent,  with  an  expression  of  goodness   that  bestowed  
pleasure  even  upon  me.  Agatha  listened  with  respect,  her  eyes  sometime  filled  with  tears,  she  
endeavoured  to  wipe  away  unperceived;  but   I  generally  found  that  her  countenance  and  tone  
were  more  cheerful  after  having  listened  to  the  exhortations  of  her  father.175    
  
Language  has  the  power  to  effect  and  indeed  affect  feelings  and  emotions.  This  understanding  
176  Language   becomes   understood   by   the   creature   here   as   a  
denotive  system  but  also  one  which  has  the  potential  to  change  things.  He  has  a  reasonably  full  
                                                                                                                    
172  ibid,  XII,  108.  
173  ibid,  107-­‐8.  
174  See  John  L.  Austin,  How  to  Do  Things  with  Words,  eds.,  Marina  Sbisà  and  J  O.  Urmson  (Cambridge  Mass.:  
Harvard  University  Press,  1975);  John  R.  Searle,  Speech  Acts:  An  Essay  in  the  Philosophy  of  Language  (Cambridge:  
Cambridge  University  Press,  1969);  and  Expression  and  Meaning:  Studies  in  the  Theory  of  Speech  Acts  (Cambridge:  
-­‐
from  speech  acts  which  describe  things,  statements,  which  he  terms  constative  utterances  and  performative  
speech  acts  which,  given  the  correct  social  context,  have  the  power  to  perform  actions  through  their  articulation.  
This  concept  of  performativity  is,  however,  developed  by  Searle,  who,  by  placing  emphasis  on  the  rules  of  language  
which  enable  a  spe
original  theory  in  its  movement  away  from  his  emphasis  on  social  context.        














langue   and   parole.   This  
perception  of  language  is  the  very  thing  which  prompts  his  urgent  desire  to  learn   it.  It  has,  he  
believes,  the  power  to  change  his  position  as  an  outcast  in  society.  Language  or  a  knowledge  of  
language  has  the  ability,  as  the  creature  sees  it,   he  deformity  of  my  
177  This   combined   with   his   vicarious   but   still   strong   emotive   connection   with   the  
cottagers  pushes  the  creature  to  further  his  understanding  of  language.      
  
It  becomes  for  the  creature  an  important  bridge  between  himself  and  the  emotional  states  of  
the  De   Laceys.   Similarly   this   connection   in   turn   becomes   important   in  his   further   learning  of  
begins   to   highlight   his   emotional   connection   with   them.   Bugg   however   highlights   the   short-­‐
lived   nature   of   this   connection.   This   affective   identification   is   soon   complicated   as   the  
Creature  begins  to  perceive  a  power  imbalance  between  himself  and  the  De  Laceys,  a  sense  of  
inferiority   that   emerges   as   he   becomes   aware   of   his   physical   difference. 178  This   process   of  
positive   identification   thus   only   becomes   a   pr s   realisation   of   his  
physical  difference  and  subsequent  realisation  that  within  Western  discourse  this  places  him  as  
being  inferior  to  the  De  Laceys.    
  
The  process  of  confinement  through  knowledge  becomes   integral   therefore   in   this   reading  of  
the  text  for  its  central  position  in  the  shaping  of     self-­‐awareness  and  in  this  way  
his   alterity.   An   understanding   of   how   social   othering,   on   the   basis   of   physical   difference,  
functions   in   this   way   informs   this   reading   of  
Platonic  fashion,179  profitable  therefore  to  turn  to  Jeremy  Bentham  as  a  means  of  highlighting  
                                                                                                                    
177  ibid,  109.  
178   59.  
179  See  Plato,  The  Republic,  trans.  Desmond  Lee  (London:  Penguin,  2007).     
methodology,  if  not  necessarily  the  reasoning  behind  it,  in  The  Republic.  Plato  writes,  after  a  number  of  failed  
ather  
short-­‐sighted  men  and  are  set  to  read  some  small  letters  at  a  distance;  one  of  us  discovers  the  same  letters  
first  and  compare  them  wi Plato,  The  Republic,  II,  ii,  368d).  This  is  not  













  self-­‐definition  can  be  placed  within  the  larger  power  structures  
which   come   to   define   him   as   other.      Panopticon,   aptly   a   prison   design,  
becomes  a  powerful  allegory  for  the  demonstration  of  the  nature  of  these  power  dynamics  at  
play   in   the   text,   in  which  surveillance  and  knowledge  are  
prison  was   designed   so   that   every   cell  would   be   visible   from  one   central   surveillance   tower;  
Foucault  writes  of  it  that     shadows  in  the  
cells  of  the  periphery.  They  are  like  so  many  cages,  so  many  small  theatres,  in  which  each  actor  
is  alone,  perfectly  individualised  and  constantly  visible. 180  This  concept  then  functions  in  much  
the  same  way  as  the  process  of  colonial  subjugation:  it  
by  a  spatial  arrangement  in  which  the  observed  is  firmly  placed  within  the  visual  power  of  the  
.181  The   mapping   and  defining  of  the  other  thus  becomes  important   in  an  attempt  
to  gain  control  over  him.  By  defining  and  describing  the  other  within  a   language  which  places  
him  as  being  at  once  distant  but  also  inferior  to  the  West,  one  is  able  to  place  the  subject  of  this  
projected  definition  or  mapping  within  a  discourse  in  which  he  becomes  known  by  the  owners  
of  the  discourse  and  understood  as  such.   Antillean  boy  
   therefore,   in   some   sense   participating,   in   much   the   same   fashion   as  
  in  his  own  ideological  subjugation:    
  
as  long  as  he  remains  among  hi   own  people,  the  little  black  follows  very  nearly  the  same  course  
as  the  little  white.  But  if  he  goes  to  Europe,  he  will  have  to  reappraise  his  lot.  For  the  Negro  in  
France,  which  is  his  country,  will  feel  different  from  other  people.  One  can  hear  the  glib  remark:  
The  Negro  makes  himself  inferior.  But  the  truth  is  that  he  is  made  inferior.182  
    
through   knowledge.   The   Antillean   boy,   comes   to   understand   first   the   savage   African   in   the  
   by   popular   culture,   or   his   comic   books.   He   understands  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
before  any  sort  of  inquiry  has  been  made  into  the  subject.  It  is  restrictive  through  the  rather  close  minded  
teleological  assumptions  it  imposes  on  itself.  That  being  said,  in  Frankenstein,  we  are  faced  with  an  example  of  
how  the  identity  of  one  single  individual  is  very  directly  affected  by  Society  as  a  whole.  It  becomes  useful  
therefore,  I  believe,  to  employ  the  Platonic  structure  of  argumentation,  if  not  necessarily  agreeing  with  the  
premise  of  his  methodology.      
180  Michel  Foucault,  Discipline  and  Punish:  The  Birth  of  the  Prison,  trans.  Alan  Sheridan  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  
1997),  200.  
181     














Spirit,  the  Bad  M 183  Secondly,  
the  pool,  once  the  boy  becomes  aware  of  his  physical  difference  from  the  largely  white  cultural  
base  in  which  he  has  become  educated,  by  in  Fanon  travelling  to  Europe,  he  begins  to  realise  
that  he  is,  within  the  discourse,  that  self-­‐same  savage.     the  
West.   In   Frankenstein,   the   creature   does   not,   however,   remain   blameless   in   this   process,  
through   his   participation   in   the   discourse   which   is   in   some   sense,   subjugating   him.   Thus,  
although   in  a  slightly  different  sense  to   that  proposed  by  Fanon   in  which   he  Negro  makes  
184  he  is  made  so  by  Western  ideological  discourse,  for  he  has  come,  through  
his  participation  in  this  discourse,  to  define,  to  map  and  know  himself  as  such.  
      
  
regime   of   power  was   largely   organised   though   spatiality   and   s 185  The   creature   in  
Frankenstein,  in  light  of  this,  only  becomes  fully  aware  of  the  extent  of  his  alterity  once  he  has  
come   to   view   himself   within   the   discourse   of   the   West.   As   this   becomes   his   own   dominant  
discourse,  he  is  able  to  recognise  and  define  himself  as  other.  His  education  thus  becomes  the  
vehicle  for  his  difference.  For,  though  he  understands  initially  that  he  is  different,  it  is  not  until  
he  becomes  
man. 186  He   becomes   in   his   own  mind   a  monster,   beginning   a   process   of   self-­‐deprecation   in  
which  he  ceases  to  recognise  himself  as  human:  
from   which   all   men   fled   and   whom   all   men   disowned? 187  The   use   of   the   neuter   pronoun  
from  very  early  on  in  his  education  to  see  himself  as  not  human.  This  realisation  as  a  moment  of  
self-­‐definition  becomes  key  as   it   is  not  any  other  person,  Western  or  otherwise,  who  defines  
himself  as  such  but  rather  himself  operating  within  the  western  discourse.  It  becomes  this  self-­‐
                                                                                                                    
183  Ibid,  146.  
184  Ibid,  149.  
185     














describe  to  you  the  agony  that  these  reflections  inflicted  upon  me;  I  tried  to  dispel  them,  but  
sorrow  only  increased  with  knowledge. 188  The  creature  thus  through  this  self-­‐realisation  places  
himself   as   the  object   of   the  power   relation,   defining   himself   in   such   a  way   that   relinquishes  
power  to  the  owners  of  the  discourse.    
  
The   colonisation   of   the   creature   becomes   in   this   context   different   however   from   physical  
colonisation,   moving   rather   towards   a   colonisation   of   the   mind189  or   at   least   towards   his  
subjugation  by  means  of  a   . 190  For  the  concepts  signified  
by  the  word  colonisation  here  suffice  to  describe  the  special  brand  of  ontological   imperialism  
e  argues  
that  
on   distant   territory. 191  If   this   can   then   be   applied   to   the   shaping   of   the   creatures   self,  
colonisation   becomes   in   this   context   a   word   denoting   cultural   subversion   and   mental  
exploitation.   However,   what   begins   to   become   apparent   as   the   text   progresses   is   how   in  
Frankenstein  language  becomes  the  carrier  of  this  mental  colonisation  or  as  Jeyifo  terms  it  the  
.192  
language   is   a   possible   source   of   deliverance   from   his   monstrous   form.   This   process   of  
linguistically   informed   colonisation   is   perhaps   not   surprising   though.   Indeed,   for   as   Ngugi  
claims,  language  becomes  a  form  of  cultural  imperialism  through  its  propensity  as  a  vehicle  for  
culture.193   ugh  orature  
and   literature,  the  entire  body  of  values  by  which  we  perceive  ourselves  and  our  place   in  the  
194  The  import  of  this  assertion  lies   in  the  ability  for  Ngugi,  of   language  to  very  directly  
                                                                                                                    
188  ibid,  XIII,  116.  
189  A  process  characterised,  not  by  the  physical  domination  of  a  people  but  through  cultural  domination,  the  
subversion  of  their  original  cultural  identities  and  eventual  complete  domination  by  the  colonizing  identity  of  the  
oppressor.  See:  Said,  Culture  and  Imperialism     Decolonizing  the  Mind:  The  Politics  of  
Language  in  African  Literature  (Lagos:  Heinemann,  1986).  
190  Janet  Semple,     (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1993),  9.  
191  Said,  Culture  and  Imperialism,  8.  
192  Biodun  Jeyifo,      Anglophonia/Caliban,  7  (2000):  83.  
193  Ngugi,  Decolonising  the  Mind.  













affect  our  perceived  place  in  the  world.  In  this  way  through  t   
he  assumes,  within  N ,  a  European  cultural  identity.  
  
Frankenstein  presents  an  interesting  take  on  this  dilemma     he  
has  the  means  of  moving  beyond  his  physical  difference   through   language.  The  creature   thus  
relates,    
  
I  looked  upon  them  as  superior  beings  who  would  be  the  arbiters  of  my  future  destiny.  I  formed  
my  imagination  a  thousand  pictures  of  presenting  myself  to  them  and  their  reception  of  me.   I  
imagined  that  they  would  be  disgusted  until,  by  my  gentle  demeanour  and  conciliating  words,  I  
should  first  win  their  favour  and  afterwards  their  love.195      
  
What  seems  to  have  happened  by  this  point   in  Frankenstein     creature   is  
aware   of   a   power   imbalance   between   himself   and   the   De   Laceys.   Importantly   however,   he  
believes  in  the  possibility  of  superseding  this  inequality  through  recourse  to  education.  He  says  
hese  thoughts  exhilarated  me  and   led  me  to  apply  with  fresh  ardour  to  the  acquiring  
196  He  reaches  therefore  towards  the  European  ideal.  He  experiences,  and  
from  early  on  begins  to  notice,  a  difference  between  himself  and  the  De  Laceys.  As  a  result  of  
the   creature s   perception   of   their   aesthetic,   physical   difference,   they   become  
197  in  his  mind,198  a  conceived  superiority  which  rises  from  his  acknowledgement  of  his  
own  physical  alterity  when  judged  in  relation  to  them.  By  his  own  admission,  however,  he  
not   yet   know   the   fatal   effects   of   this  miserable   deformity. 199  Thus,   one   is   presented  with   a  
to   fully   conceive   of   the   implications   of   their   physical   difference   as   viewed   by   the   European  
centre  which   they  are  striving   to  emulate.  This  becomes   in  many  ways   the   tragedy,   for  while  
both  are  able  to  approach  a  level  of  education  and  civilisation  which  supersedes  that  of  the  vast  
majority  of  Europeans,  they  are  never  able  to  ever   fully  embody  the  European   identity  which  
                                                                                                                    
195  F.,  XII,  110.  
196  ibid  
197  ibid  
198  An  interesting  judgment  considering  he  is  judging  them  within  the  European  aesthetic  and  in  many  respects  
from  an  increasingly  European  perspective  even  from  this  early  point  in  his  existence.  













they   are   striving   for.   The   creature,   however,   has   not   made   the   Fanonian  
.200  M
himself   as   a   black   man...   The   Negro   lives   in   Africa. 201   ature  
recognises  his  physical  difference  this  does  not,  in  his  mind,  define  him  as  savage  as  he  believes  
he  possesses  the  possibility  of  moving,  through  language  beyond  this.  Mellor  here  argues  that  
Shelley,  through  Frankenstein,   Jacques  Derrida  and  Michel  Foucault:  
human  knowledge   is   the  product  of   invented  or   linguistically   constructed   forms  or  grammars  
.202  This   is  
important  as  it  ties  the  creature -­‐loathing  and  othering  in  with  colonial  power  and  displays  
the  influence  which  discourse  has  over  epistemological  and  indeed  ontological  conceptions  of  
self.   It   brings   to   the   fore   that  which  Mellor   sees   as   b
world,  of  our  habit  of  imposing  meanings  on  that  which  we  cannot  truly  know. 203  
  
As   interestingly  has  no  original  culture  or  language,  his  initial  seemingly  
void  cultural  state  thus  allows  for  him  to  be  seen  by  society  and  defined  almost  purely,  initially  
at  least,  on  the  basis  of  his  physical  difference.  What  this  in  turn  allows  for  is  an  interrogation  of  
the  very  concept  of  racial  inequality.  Thus,  in  his  own  words,  as  has  already  been  discussed,  the  
creature   asserts   his   own   innate   goodness,   displaying   how   his   identity   becomes   governed   by  
society   rather   than   any   inborn   nature.   For   this   reason   Frankenstein   presents   an   interesting  
study  here  for  the  creature  becomes  a  personification  of  the  Lockean  tabula  rasa.204  Indeed,  he  
laments  that,  
  
                                                                                                                    
200   anon  puts  it  this  way:   The  Negro  lives  in  Africa.  Subjectively,  
intellectually,  the  Antillean  conducts  himself  like  a  white  man.  But  he  is  a  Negro.  That  he  will  learn  once  he  goes  to  
Europe;  and  when  he  hears  the  Negroes  mentioned  he  will  recognize  that  the  word  includes  himself  as  well  as  the  
Senegalese ibid,  148).  
201  ibid  
202   Frankenstein   
203  ibid  













No  father  had  watched  my  infant  days,  no  mother  had  blessed  me  with  smiles  and  caresses;  or  if  
they  had,  all  my  past  life  was  now  a  blot,  a  blind  vacancy  in  which  I  distinguished  nothing.  From  
my  earliest  remembrance  I  had  been  as  I  was  in  height  and  proportion.205    
  
206  His   identity  and  knowledge  of  the  world  become,   it  would  seem,  based  entirely  
on  experience.  In  fact  the  creature  holds  with  this  claiming  that  this  has  shaped  his  identity  and  
again  be  
207   His   description   of   his   education   also   seems   to   conform   to   this   and   the  
208  While   later  he  becomes  shaped  
by   his   exposure   to   literature   as  well   as   his   interactions  with   other   people   his   initial   state   of  
being   and   experience   of   learning   is   perhaps  more   fundamentally   in   keeping   with   the   above  
expressed  Lockean  ideal.    
  
In  this  mode  of  think
209  before  being   corrupted  by  
society,  this  certainly  informs  how  he  should  be  read  as  a  character.  For  his  initial  state  of  living  
in  communion  with  nature  becomes  it  would  seem  a  vehicle  through  which  the  text  is  thus  able  
to   expound   upon   Rousseau   
210  Through  the  presentation  of      Shelley
highlights,  in  keeping  with  Rousseau,  that  
of  man,  that  we  owe   211  The  text  
would  seemingly,   from  this  perspective,  place   the  corrupted  virtues  of   the  West  as  being   the  
reason   for   the   corruption   of   the   creature   and   similarly   the   colonial   subject.   At   a  most   basic  
                                                                                                                    
205  F.,  XII,  116-­‐7.  
206  John  Locke,  Two  Treatises  of  Civil  Government  (London:  J.  M.  Dent  &  Sons  Ltd.,  1953),  II,  i,  2,  42.  
207  F.,  X,  96.  
208  Locke,  Civil  Government,  II.  i,  2,  42    
209  F.,  X,  96.  
210  Jean-­‐Jacques  Rousseau,   ,  in  The  Social  Contract  and  the  Discourses,  trans.  George  D.  H.  
Cole  (London:  J.  M.  Dent  and  Sons  Ltd.,  1913),  181.  













level,  one  can  see  the  beginning  of  this  process   in  his  early  naïve,  empirical  understanding  of  
the  world  which   only   becomes   corrupted   once   he   is   exposed   to   language   and   consequently  






































Emile	  or,	  the	  Modern	  Prometheus?	  
  
As  Frankenstein  progresses     creature  begins  to  represent  something  close  to  the  
mantra  on  which  Rousseau  predicates  Emile:  that  man  existing   in  a  natural  state  as  a  morally  
ambivalent   creature,   once   exposed   to   society,   has   the   potential   to   become   corrupted.   The  
Natural  Man,212  towards  what  could  be  termed  educated  and  civilised:213  although  he  remains  
in  Rousseauean  terms  corrupted  to  an  extreme  degree.  Shelley ,  
creature  thus  presents  a  thought  experiment  which  becomes  I  believe  in  a  sense  more  poignant  
than   that   put   forward   by   Rousseau   in   Emile   through   its   demonstration   of   the   failure   of  
education  in  the  face  of  overwhelming  social  convention.  For,  education  becomes  for  Rousseau  
a  means  of  shaping  a  person  who  can  to  some  degree  resist  the  influences  of  society.  For,  as  he  
puts  it,   214  and  while  he  condemns  the  
corrupting   influence   of   society   and   acknowledges   the   imperfect   nature   of   his   educational  
215  The  extent  of  the  
t   his  Rousseauean  education.   In  many  ways  
                                                                                                                    
212  See  Rousseau,  On  the  Origins  of  Inequality
with  the  philosophical  process  of  stripping  humanity  of  social  convention  in  order  to  better  understand  human  
process  of  human  progression  from  
evidence  to  support  his  theory.  Even  if  the  premise  of  his  argument  does  not  place  much  import  on  it,  Rousseau  
does  draw  on  a  largely  racialised  set  of  exemplar  in  order  to  define  his  Natural  Man.  His  term  thus  becomes  
ibid,  165)  on  which  
he  predicates  the  term.  Thus  while  it  i
discourse  of  racial  othering  of  his  time  and  it  becomes  difficult  to,  as  a  result  of  this,  understand  his  Natural  Man  
reason  can  in  some  way  be  said  to  
ideologically  mirror,  while  perhaps  not  as  Rousseau  intended  it,  the  Natural  Man,  in  among  other  things  their  dual  
construction  on  the  basis  of  early  racial  stereotyping.  What  does  however  prove  more  striking  a  similarity,  is  the  
and  thus  social  
he  seeks.  
213  Rousseau,  Emile,  I,  5.  
214  ibid,  6.  













  serves,   through  his  rejection  by  society,  to  highlight  the  failure  of  this  
education.    
  
In  Emile  Rousseau  argues  that  through  education  it  is  important  to  reconcile  the  individual  and  
society.  For   it   is  only  through  harmony  between  the  two  that  one  can  attain  self-­‐reliance  and  
move  away  from  dependence  on  others.216  He  divides  humankind  into  two  classes:  the  Natural  
Man  and   the   citizen he  natural  man   lives   for  himself;  he   is   a  unit,   the  whole,   dependent  
only   on   himself   and   on   his   like.   The   citizen   is   but   the   numerator   of   a   fraction,   whose   value  
217  It  
is  for  Rousseau  the  disjuncture  between  these  two  aspects  of  our  educatio   which  gives  rise  to  
many  of  the  contradictions  which  define  humanity  and  which  in  turn  become  a  major  obstacle  
to   human   happiness.218  The   education   of   Emile   is   thus   formulated   in   such   a   way   to   remove  
these   contradictions.   This   is   perhaps   where   one   can   see   the   education   of   Fr
creature   failing   so   spectacularly,   for   the   creature   becomes   educated,   as   has   been   discussed,  
into  and  within  an  idiom  which  actively  rejects  him.  He  is  taught  to  aspire  to  a  set  of  standards  
and  a  community  which  is  grounded  in  its  active  exclusion  of  him.  His  corruption  would  seem  to  
be,   in   Rousseauean   terms,   the   product   of   his   inability   to   reconcile   his   personal   and   public  
identities   and   education,   or   perhaps  more   crudely,   the   disjuncture  which   exists   between   his  
physical,  non-­‐European  nature  and  his  world  view  as   construed  through  his   largely  European  
education.    
  
While   in   some   senses   correct,   it   is   I   believe   worth   challenging,   therefore,   the   established  
Rousseauean  reading  of  Frankenstein.  It  is  not  generally  a  complicated  one.  Paul  Cantor  writes  
in  defence  of  just  this  reading,  that  "[o]ne  could  undertake  a  fairly  simple  interpretation  of  the  
monster's   story   in   Rousseauean   terms.   The   monster   as   originally   created   corresponds   to  
Natural  Man  ...  The  story  would  then  show  how  civilization  corrupts  an  essentially  benevolent  
                                                                                                                    
216  Robert  Wokler,  Rousseau:  A  Very  Short  Introduction  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press  ,  2001),  115.  
217  Rousseau,  Emile,  I,  7.  













219  This   understanding   of   the   creature   fails   on   two   levels.   Firstly   with  
regard   to   the   creature s   education   and   secondly,   which   is   in   no   way   unrelated,   his  
incorporation,   or   lack   thereof,   into   society.   What   Cantor   fails   to   demonstrate   is   that   the  
s  to  a   large  extent   to  that   suggested  by  Rousseau,  an  education  
which   is  expressly  designed   to  defend  against   the  very  process  of   socially   induced  corruption  
embodied  by   the   creature   in   the   text.   I  would  argue   that   this   therefore  places   the   text,   to   a  
220  
Secondly  as  James  
Rousseauean     beings,  when  grouped  together,  become  
221  This  socialised  malevolence  is  important  for  it  informs  the  process  by  which  the  
creature   becomes   corru
edly   the   creature  does   correspond   to  
the   Rousseauean   Natural   Man,   his   eventual   corruption   by   society   diverts   somewhat   from  
work.   The   creature,   though   rejected   by   society   because   of   his   physical  
difference,   through   his   education   further   rejects   his   own   position   in   society,   in   essence  
excluding   himself   from   society   and   its   established   codes   of   behaviour.   By   educating   the  
creature  within  a  European  framework  Shelley  gives  him  the  agency  to  distance  himself  from  it.  
mplicit  inclusion  
in   the   process   whereby   he   becomes   corrupted.   The   text   thus   highlights   the   overwhelming  
failure  and  fallibility  of     Natural  Man  when  confronted  with  the  education  proposed  
in   Emile.   Indeed   what   Frankenstein   and   perhaps   more   specifically   the   education   of  
222   when  
confronted  with  a  subject  who  falls  outside  of  the  established  Eurocentric  norms  of  the  time.  
ation   and   subsequent   physiological   difference   become   in   light   of   this  
more  than  incidental  or  even  superficial  and  become  significant  in  their  influence  not  merely  on  
                                                                                                                    
219  Cantor,  Creature  and  Creator,  120.  
220  This  could,  however,  be  viewed  conversely  as  the  success  of  a  codified  colonial  education  in  preservation  of  the  
exclusivity  of  the  ruling  class  and  thus  the  exclusion  of  the  creat
-­‐34.  
221     













his   rejection   by   society   but   more   importantly   on   his   eventual   naturalised   self-­‐loathing   and  
rejection  of  himself.  For   this   reason  Frankenstein  becomes   interesting   in   its  demonstration  of  
the  destructive  effects  which  both  language  and  through  education,  imperialist  ideologies  have  
on  the  colonial  subject.    
  
   historical   and   literary   curriculum   is   thus   very   pertinent   and   would   seem   to  
represent   a   form  of   the  education  which   Shelley  herself  would  have  been  exposed   to   at   the  
hands  of  her  father,  William  Godwin.223  Maureen  
Goethe,  Milton,  Plutarch  and  Volney,  the  creature  receives  a  highly  specified  course   inflected  
by   concerns   both      S
political  and  aesthetic  education  suggests   that  he  serves  as  an  experimental   subject   for  what  
Godwin  c .224  This  education  certainly  plays  a  prominent  role  in  
the  development  of  his  sense  of  self  as  well  as  his  eventual   ideas  with  regard  to  morality  and  
justice.    
  
His   historical   education   comes,   at   this  point,   Ruins   of   Empire  which   Felix   is  
using  to  teach  Safie225  how  to  read.  As  Pamela  Clemit  argues,  Volney  operates  on  a  more  global  
,226  
                                                                                                                    
223  See  Maureen  N.  McLane,     and  Frankenstein   
,  ed.  Harold  Bloom  (New  York:  Chelsea  House  
Publishers,  2007),  105.  It  is  interesting  to  note  here,  that  if  one  is  to  accept  the  parallel  suggested  with  Rousseau,  
this  would  suggest  a  rejection  of  this  self-­‐   
224  ibid  
225  
Sophie  in  Emile.  An  interesting  parallel  for  it  is  S
  chapter  of  A  
Vindication  of  the  Right  of  Women.  See  Mary  Wollstonecraft,  A  Vindication  of  the  Rights  of  Women  (London:  David  
Campbell  Publishers,  1992),  84-­‐123.  Significantly  it  is  also  through  Sophie  that  Wollstonecraft  attacks  the  system  of  
education  ad Emile  to  
Frankenstein   
226  Pamela  Clemit,     The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Mary  Shelley,  ed.  













on   issues   of   individual   morality   at   different   stages   of   Western   civilisation. 227  Perhaps   more  
importantly,   however,   he   gains   the   ability   to   recognise   the   extent   of   his   exclusion   from   the  
culture   he   now  possesses,   a   point   brought   home  poignantly   in   both   The   Sufferings   of   Young  
Werther  and  Paradise  Lost.  The  creature  sees  in  these  texts  parallels  with  his  own  experience.  
His  own  experience  of  the  De  Lacey  family,  for  instance,   ,  who  on  his  
return   from  Weimar   is   subsequently   excluded   from   the   relationship   between   Charlotte   and  
Albert.  The  texts  become,  for  the  creature,  emblematic  of  his  own  situation,  prompting  him  to  
relate  of  the  Goethe  novel  that  it  
228  This  is  an  important  admission  
considering   the  discovery   of   the  novels   comes  almost   immediately   after   a   similar   expression  
become  an  actor   in   the  busy  scene  where  so  many  admirable  qualities  were  called   forth  and  
229  He  is   in   just  the  same  position  as  Werther,  forced  to,  as  J
on  at  a  family  happiness  he  knows  he  can  never  share. 230   Paradise  Lost  is  all  the  more  
important  in  light  of  this.  The  creature  claims,    
  
But  Paradise   Lost  excited   different   and   far   deeper   emotions.   I   read   it,   as   I   had   read   the   other  
volumes   which   had   fallen   into   my   hand,   as   a   true   history      I   often   referred   to   the   several  
situations,  as  their  similarity  struck  me,  to  my  own.  Like  Adam,  I  was  apparently  united  by  no  link  
to  any  other  being  in  existence;  but  his  state  was  far  different  from  mine  in  every  other  respect  
condition,  for  often,  like  him,  when  I  viewed  the  bliss  of  my  protectors,  the  bitter  gall  of  envy  rose  
within  me.  231  
  
domestic   sphere.   His   identification   with   Satan   is   telling   of   a   sense   of   rejection   far   more  
profound  and  on  a  far  larger  scale  to  that  expressed  in  The  Sufferings  of  Young  Werther.  Satan  
becomes  emblematic  of  his  positioning  of  himself  in  relation  to  European  society.  This  likening  
                                                                                                                    
227  ibid  
228  ibid,  124.  
229  F.,  XV,  123.  
230  John   Frankenstein A  Companion  to  Romanticism,  ed.  Duncan  Wu  (Oxford:  Blackwell  
Publishers,  2001),  232.  













reflects,   in  some  ways,  the  moment   in  which  he  comes  to  internalise  the  discursive  system  of  
othering  presented   initially   through  Volney   in  which,  when  
American   hemisphere   
.232  His  identification  with  the  outcast  is  taken  through  Milton  to  the  extreme  as  he  
fitter  emblem  of  [his]  condition. 233  Brooks  relates  therefore,  that  the  
in   of  
   him   fully   aware   of   his   unique   and   accursed  
orig .234    
  
As   the   creature  becomes,   therefore,   fully  aware  of  his  place  within   the   imperial   tradition,  he  
becomes   the  object  of   the   colonial   examples  put   forward  by  Volney.  He  becomes,   to   a   large  
degree,   powerless   within   the   Eurocentric   colonial   ideology   which   he   himself,   through   his  
education,   becomes   complicit   in.   Frankenstein
discourse   recognises   himself   as   other   and   subsequently   feels   the   need   to   define   and   know  
235  binary.  
Indeed,  while  it  may  not  be  true,  discourse  in  this  context  allows  for  validation  of  this  ontology  
for   it   is   236  because,   in  
these  terms,   .237  Thus  it  
becomes  only  the  European  concept  of  aesthetic  which  places  the  creature  as  inferior  to  the  De  
Laceys   in   his   mind,   rather   than   any   natural   inferiority.   Knowledge   and   power   thus   become  
intimately   linked.   Foucault,   in   keeping  with   this   view,  
asserts  the  belief  that  it  is  necessary  to  abandon  traditional  epistemological  beliefs,  stating  that    
  
imply  one  another;  that  there  is  no  power  relation  without  the  correlative  constitution  of  a  field  
                                                                                                                    
232  F.,  XII,  115.  
233  ibid,  XV,  125.  
234     
235     
236  ibid,  293.  













of   knowledge,   nor   any   knowledge   that   does   not   presuppose   and   constitute   at   the   same   time  
power  relations.238    
  
Establishing  a  knowledge  of  himself  thus  becomes  integral  to  the  creature s  self-­‐realisation  as  
other,   which   in   turn   places   him   within   the   power   of   the   owners   of   his   defining   discourse.  
  discourse  produces  constitutes  a  kind  of  power,  exercised  over  
a  particular  way  will  be  subject  (i.e.  subjected)  to  it .239    
  
This  power  becomes  however   increasingly  potent  as  the  creature   internalises   it.  The  creature  
thus  moves  from  a  position  in  which  he  is  attacked  because  of  his  physical  difference  by  some  
villagers240  to  a  point  of  self-­‐loathing  in  which  he  perceives  himself  in  the  same  way  the  villagers  
did,   as   a   monster.   The   creature   thus   becomes   subject   to   the   very   dynamic   from   whence  
colonisation  derives   its   power.   The   education   of   the   creature   demonstrates   therefore   a   very  
pertinent  critique  of  colonialism  in  which  the  civilising  premise  of  the  system  functions  rather  to  
establish  an  even  more  imbalanced  power  dynamic  between  the  coloniser  and  colonised.  Thus,  
as  Malchow  argues,     has  taught  him  self-­‐contempt   just  as  the   little  
education   given   the   plantation   black   or   freed   slave   served   merely   to   reinforce   his   own  
awareness  of   inferiority. 241      in  this  
way   merely   as   another   tool   for   the   exploitation   of   the   colonised,   indeed   one   can   see   how  
pretensions  to     ci   
to   -­‐   both  the  colonizer  and  the  colonized. 242  Colonisation  thus  induces  
cultural   imperialism   through   this   process   of   civilisation,   or   normalisation   from   the   European  
perspective,   which   through   the   redefinition   of   a   people  within   a   foreign   discourse   results   in  
243  and   in   this  case   identity.  
                                                                                                                    
238  Foucault,  Discipline  and  Punish,  27.  
239   ,  for  the  most  part,  presenting  here  a  summary  of  the  arguments  
proposed  by  Foucault  in,  Discipline  and  Punish,  201.  
240  F.,  XI,  101.  
241     
242     













Indeed  one   can   thus   see   that   the   very   act   of   civilisation,   so   dear   to   the   colonial   ideology,   is  
fundamentally  flawed.  
  
This  leads  to  the  strange  juxtaposition  whereby  the  colonial  power  seems  to  suggest,  as  Samir  
Amin  argues,  
challeng ,244  while  at  the  same  time  stressing   the  unattainability  of   this   for  the  
colonial  subject.   In  this  way  the  colonial  subject   is  subjected  to  a  form  of  cultural   imperialism  
which   asserts   the   ideologies   and   beliefs   of   the   coloniser   at   the   expense   of   those   of   the  
colonised,  while  at  the  same  time  excluding  him  from  the  very  discourse  which  is  supplanting  
his   own   culture.   This   process   is   however   important  within   the   framework   of   colonisation   as  
through   this  process  of   ideological   and   cultural   colonisation   the   coloniser   is   able   to   far  more  
effectively  affect  control  over  the  subject.    
  
ation   is   thus   important   for   it  becomes   in  many  ways   the  key  difference  
ion  fails.  Despite  
s   glorification   of   the   Natural  M
need  to  return  to  a  more  natural  state,  he  does  not  concern  himself  with  the  racial  aspect,  so  
integral      concept   of   the   Noble   Savage.   While   humans   are   seen   as  
initially  good,  humanity   is   for  Rousseau  contingent  on  civic   society  and   the   idea  of   the   social  
contract,245  but   importantly  this   idea  remains  rooted  very  strongly   in  Europe  and   in  European  
social   conventions.   Indeed   as  
was   located   within   the   European   psyche   itself   rather   than   in   the   interiors   of   Africa   or   the  
246  The  fact  that  the  creature  is  physiologically  distinguished  from  European  society  
becomes  the  major  departure  therefore  from  the  Rousseauean  framework  and  allows  the  text  
to  place  the  creature  in  opposition  to  this  same  society.  He  exists  outside  of  the  social  contract,  
ity  and  his  subsequent  
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education   that  one   is   able   to  explore   this  paradox   in   the   text,  which   in   turn  becomes   key   to  
understanding  just  how  the  novel  functions  within  colonial  discourse.  
  
Frankenstein,   through   the   education   and   growing   self-­‐awareness   of   Fra
creation,  thus  becomes  a  pertinent  critique  not  only  of  the  colonial  state  but  also  of  the  society  
which  gave  rise  to  it.  Shelley   
which  operate  on  a  purely   somatic   level  with  no  perceivable  moral   justification.   It  brings   the  
European  conception  of  humanity   itself   into  question,  while  making   it  apparent   just  how   the  
established  European  discourse  functions   in   its  ability  to  seemingly  arbitrarily  grant  or  deny  a  
person   h
becomes  increasingly  tragic  through  his  own  self-­‐loathing,  becoming  in  turn  a  depiction  of  the  
fate   of   the   other   within   a   society   which   cannot   come   to   terms   with   that   which   it   does   not  
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